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Fair-by-design matching
David Garc´ıa-Soriano · Francesco Bonchi
Abstract Matching algorithms are used routinely to match donors to recipients
for solid organs transplantation, for the assignment of medical residents to hospi-
tals, record linkage in databases, scheduling jobs on machines, network switching,
online advertising, and image recognition, among others. Although many optimal
solutions may exist to a given matching problem, when the elements that shall or
not be included in a solution correspond to individuals, it becomes of paramount
importance that the solution be selected fairly.
In this paper we study individual fairness in matching problems. Given that
many maximum matchings may exist, each one satisfying a different set of indi-
viduals, the only way to guarantee fairness is through randomization. Hence we
introduce the distributional maxmin fairness framework which provides, for any
given input instance, the strongest guarantee possible simultaneously for all in-
dividuals in terms of satisfaction probability (the probability of being matched
in the solution). Specifically, a probability distribution over feasible solutions is
maxmin-fair if it is not possible to improve the satisfaction probability of any
individual without decreasing it for some other individual which is no better off.
In the special case of matchings in bipartite graphs, our framework is equivalent
to the egalitarian mechanism of Bogomolnaia and Mouline.
Our main contribution is a polynomial-time algorithm for fair matching build-
ing on techniques from minimum cuts, and edge-coloring algorithms for regular
bipartite graphs, and transversal theory. For bipartite graphs, our algorithm runs
in O((|V |2+ |E||V |2/3) · (log |V |)2) expected time and scales to graphs with tens of
millions of vertices and hundreds of millions of edges. To the best of our knowledge,
this provides the first large-scale implementation of the egalitarian mechanism.
Our experimental analysis confirms that our method provides stronger satisfac-
tion probability guarantees than non-trivial baselines.
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1 Introduction
Decision-making tools relying on data and quantitative measures have become per-
vasive in application domains such as education and employment, finance, search
and recommendation, policy making, and criminal justice. Awareness and con-
cern about the risks of unfair automated decisions is quickly rising, as it has been
argued that decisions informed by data analysis could have inadvertent discrimi-
natory effects due to potential bias existing in the data or encoded in automated
decisions. Several reports [1,2] call for algorithms that are “fair by design” and
identify “poorly designed matching systems” as one of the main flaws of algorith-
mic decision-making. The way to tackle the ensuing ethical and societal issues has
garnered the attention of the research community [22]. However, despite the fact
that matching mechanisms lie at the basis of many automated decision systems,
the bulk of the research in the area of algorithmic bias and fairness has mainly
focused on avoiding discrimination against a sensitive attribute (i.e., a protected
social group) in supervised machine learning [43].
Our work departs from this literature in three main directions: (1) we focus
on individual fairness (as opposed to group-level fairness); (2) we focus on bias
stemming from the algorithm design itself, rather than the bias existing in the input
data; (3) instead of supervised learning we focus on matching problems, where the
solution may not be unique and individuals correspond to elements to be included
in the solution.
In this setting, the satisfaction (utility) function of each individual is based on
whether the individual has been selected or not for inclusion. At the very least,
two individuals satisfying all relevant criteria equally well (e.g., having the same
skill set) should have, in principle, the same expected utility; moreover, individuals
having a wider or a more unique skill set (covering relevant criteria that others
can’t cover), should reasonably be rewarded with higher expected utility. This is
often not the case as algorithms may be “biased by design”: bias may stem from
something as petty as the order in which the algorithm chooses to process the list
of candidates in its main loop (e.g., by irrelevant attributes such as alphabetical
order or application date), or details about the internal workings of the algorithm.
The prototypical example of a “biased by design” algorithm (in a rather extreme
way) arises in the context of stable matching (a different problem from the one
considered in this paper): the Gale-Shapley algorithm [29] produces a solution
which is always the best for every man and the worst for every woman, among all
feasible solutions, despite the existence of another solution which lies provably “in
the middle” for every man and woman [53].
Algorithmic bias and randomization. Consider a job-search setting where we
have a certain number of positions and applicants. Assume that each applicant has
a binary fitting for each of the positions (either she is fit for the job or not) and
a binary satisfaction function (either she is selected or not). This can be modeled
as a matching problem in a bipartite graph. Unless a matching covering simulta-
neously all applicants exists, some of them will have to be left out. An unselected
applicant could notice that there are other matchings (even maximum-size match-
ings) satisfying her. However, any deterministic algorithm is programmed to pick
a specific one which may not include her: she might rightfully deem this unfair.
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Fig. 1 An example bipartite graph between people (on the left) and jobs (on the right).
Unlike the Gale-Shapley algorithm, whose bias can be simply characterized by
a theorem, for the problems we consider in this paper it may be hard to tell in
advance which particular individuals a given algorithm favours. However, the fact
that the bias is not easy to pinpoint does not mean it does not exist, just that we
do not know what it is.
Since no single candidate solution satisfying all individuals at the same time
can exist in general, we turn our attention to randomized algorithms, which make
random choices to pick from among several valid solutions.
In our job-search example, imagine there is a single open position and n appli-
cants fit for it. Intuitively, all applicants are “equally qualified” in this case and
the fairest solution would choose one of them uniformly at random, giving each
applicant a guaranteed satisfaction (matching) probability of 1/n. However, as the
graph between applicants and jobs grows more complex, it becomes unclear how
to proceed, or what properties one should demand of a fair distribution of solu-
tions. Our next example illustrates why requiring exactly the same satisfaction
probability for all individuals would not make for a good definition.
Example 1 (Satisfaction probability). Consider the problem of finding a match-
ing on the bipartite graph of Figure 1 between people (on the left) and jobs (on
the right). Let U = {a0, a1, a2, a3} and let S denote the set of all possible match-
ings. An individual u ∈ U is satisfied by a solution S ∈ S iff it is matched in
S (i.e., she is selected for the job). Consider the distribution D assigning prob-
ability 13 to each of the following solutions: M1 = {(a0, b0), (a1, b1), (a2, b2)},
M2 = {(a0, b0), (a1, b1), (a3, b2)}, M3 = {(a2, b2), (a3, b1)} and zero probability
to all the other matchings.
The satisfaction probability of each individual under distribution D is exactly
the same, namely 23 .While D might naively look “fair”, notice that the job b0
is left unassigned in M3, despite the existence of a fitting candidate occasionally
left unemployed (a0). This artificially restricts the satisfaction probability of a0.
Observe that, for any matching covering a subset T ⊆ {a1, a2, a3}, there is another
matching covering T∪{a0}. So a0 can always be satisfied without impacting anyone
else’s chances, hence any reasonable solution should match a0 with probability 1.
Other applicants will have lower satisfaction probability though (as no matching
can satisfy all of a1, a2 and a3 at the same time).
The insight from Example 1 leads us to the key definition of our work. Our
aim is to provide, on any given input instance, the strongest guarantee possible
for all individuals, in terms of satisfaction probability. We thus introduce the dis-
tributional maxmin fairness framework. Informally, a distribution over matchings
is maxmin-fair if it is impossible to improve the satisfaction probability of any
individual without decreasing it for some other individual which is no better off
(see Section 2 for a formal definition).
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Example 2 (Maxmin-fair distribution). Consider Example 1 again. A distribu-
tion assigning non-zero probability to a solution not covering a0 (such as M3)
cannot be maxmin-fair, as otherwise one can increase the satisfaction probability
of a0 without detriment to anyone else. On the other hand, notice that {a1, a2, a3}
have only two neighbors {b1, b2}, making it impossible to guarantee satisfaction
probability ≥ 23 for a1, a2 and a3 at the same time. This graph has four maxi-
mum matchings: M1 and M2 from Example 1, M4 = {(a0, b0), (a1, b2), (a3, b1)},
and M5 = {(a0, b0), (a2, b2), (a3, b1)}. The distribution F1 choosing from among
M1,M2,M4 and M5 with probability
1
3 ,
1
6 ,
1
6 ,
1
3 , respectively, is maxmin-fair. The
satisfaction probabilities of a0, a1, a2 and a3 are then 1,
2
3 ,
2
3 ,
2
3 . Any attempt to
match, say, a1 with probability >
2
3 will necessarily result in satisfaction probabil-
ity < 23 for a2 or a3. Another maxmin-fair distribution is, e.g., the distribution F2
choosing uniformly at random from among M1,M2 and M5.
Overview of our contributions. The contributions of this paper can be sum-
marized as follows:
– We introduce and characterize the distributional maxmin-fairness framework
providing, on any given problem instance, the strongest guarantee possible for
all individuals, in terms of satisfaction probability (Section 2). While in this
paper, for sake of simplicity of presentation, we focus on matching problems,
our definition applies to a wider variety of problems (such as those listed in
Example 5).
– In Section 3, we show that when the structure of valid solutions forms a ma-
troid (which is the case for matchings), maxmin-fairness minimizes the largest
inequality gap in satisfaction probabilities between all pairs of individuals,
among all Pareto-efficient distributions (Theorem 2). We also observe that for
such problems the “price of fairness” is zero: maxmin fairness is attainable at
no cost in solution size.
– We give a characterization of the “degree of fairness” attainable in any bi-
partite matching instance (Theorem 15) and any matroid problem instance
(Theorem 15), generalizing the classical marriage theorem due to Hall [34].
– We apply our framework to matching problems in bipartite graphs (Sections 4
and 5), leading to our main contribution: an exact algorithm for maxmin-
fair bipartite matching with running time O((|V |2 + |E||V |2/3) · (log |V |)2)
(Theorem 7). We also obtain a polynomial time maxmin-fair algorithm for
matching in general graphs by a reduction to the aforementioned bipartite
case (Theorem 12).
– We discuss how to achieve full transparency for real-world deployment of our
framework (Section 7). The discussion leads to the problem of producing a
maxmin-fair distribution with small support, for which we offer an approach
making small modifications to our algorithm.
– Our experiments (Section 8) show that our algorithm performs faster in prac-
tice than its theoretical running time and scales to graphs with tens of millions
of vertices and hundreds of millions of edges, taking only a few minutes on a
simple architecture. Our analysis confirms that our method provides stronger
satisfaction probability guarantees than non-trivial baselines.
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2 Problem definition
In this section we provide the key definition of our distributional maxmin-fairness
framework, considering a very general search problem instance I = (U ,S) defined
over a finite set of individuals U and where S 6= ∅ denotes the set of feasible
solutions for the problem instance I. (For example, instance I could represent
a bipartite graph between jobs and a set U of applicants, and S the set of all
matchings.) We assume that for every solution S ∈ S, each individual u ∈ U
is either fully satisfied or fully dissatisfied, and this is the only property of the
solution we are concerned with. Thus, for the sake of simplicity, we will identify
each solution in S with the subset of users satisfied by it, so S ⊆ 2U . Note that S
is defined implicitly by the structure of the problem, and not explicitly encoded
in the input.
Given I, our problem is to return an element of S while providing a fairness
guarantee to all individuals in U . Since in general no single candidate solution
satisfying all u ∈ U at the same time exists (U /∈ S), we seek a randomized
algorithm A that, for any given problem instance I, always halts and selects
one solution A(I) from S. Thus A induces a probability distribution D over S:
PrD[S] = Pr[A(I) = S] for each S ∈ S. The satisfaction probability of each
individual u ∈ U under D is defined by D[u] = PrS∼D[u ∈ S].
Based on the insight from Example 1, we next provide the key definition of our
work. Informally, a distribution over solutions is maxmin-fair if it is impossible
to improve the satisfaction probability of any individual without decreasing it for
some other individual which is no better off.
Definition 1 (Maxmin-fairness) A distribution F over S is maxmin-fair for
U if for all distributions D over S and all u ∈ U ,
D[u] > F [u] =⇒ ∃v ∈ U | D[v] < F [v] ≤ F [u]. (1)
Similarly, a randomized algorithm is maxmin-fair if it induces a maxmin-fair
distribution.
Finding a maxmin-fair distribution involves solving a continuous optimization
problem over (infinitely many) distributions over the set S of valid solutions (which
is commonly exponential in size). The challenge we face is thus how to design an
efficient randomized algorithm inducing a maxmin-fair distribution.
Problem 1 For a given search problem, design a randomized algorithm A which
always terminates and such that, for each instance I = (U ,S), the distribution of
A(I) is maxmin-fair for U over S.
While our definition applies to a wider variety of search problems, in this paper,
for sake of simplicity of presentation, we solve Problem 1 in the case where the
search problem is a matching problem in a graph. Let us specify what the sets U
of users and S of solutions are in this case (Table 1 below summarizes the notation
used throughout the paper).
Let G = (V,E) be an unweighted simple graph. A matching in G is a set of
vertex-disjoint edges of G. A maximum matching is a matching of largest size.
The matching M covers a vertex v ∈ V if v is incident to some edge in M . A set
S ⊆ V is matchable if there is a matching of G covering all of S. For S ⊆ V , define
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Table 1 Summary of notation.
symbol meaning
G = (V, E) undirected, unweighted graph with vertex set V and edge set E
U set of users; U ⊆ V for matchings
S ⊆ 2U collection of feasible solutions (possible subsets of satisfied users)
ΓG(A) set of neighbours of A ⊆ V in G
V = L∪˙R bipartition of the vertex set V of a bipartite graph
ρ(A) (for graphs) size of the largest matchable subset of A ⊆ V
ρ : 2L → N (for matroids) rank function of a matroid with ground set L
D distribution of subsets of S
D[v] satisfaction probability of user u under distribution D
D↑ vector of satisfaction probabilities of D in increasing order
D↓ vector of satisfaction probabilities of D in decreasing order
≻ lexicographical order of vectors
pi(G) minimum satisfaction probability of a maxmin-fair distribution for G
Π(G) maximum satisfaction probability of a maxmin-fair distribution for G
xuv probability of u being matched to v in a fixed maxmin-fair distribution
B1, . . . , Bk fair decomposition of L into blocks
(F (X))X∼D distribution of random variable F (X) when X is drawn from D
G|
A
subgraph of G induced by A ∪ Γ (A)
M |
A
restriction of matroid M to the set A
G/A subgraph of G induced by (L ∪ R) \ (A ∪ Γ (A))
M |
A
contraction of matroid M to the set A
ρG(S) as the size of the largest matchable subset of S; then ρG(V ) is the size of
the maximum matching of G. Denote by ΓG(S) the set of neighbours of S in G.
We will drop the G subscript when no confusion may arise.
In the fair matching problem, the input is a graph G = (V,E) and a set U ⊆ V
of users. Following our assumption of binary satisfaction, user u ∈ U is satisfied
by a matching M if u is covered by M . The set S of valid solutions is the set of
matchable subsets of U . The set S is not part of the input given to the algorithm,
but implicitly defined by G and U .
While the results provided in Section 3 hold for fair-matching on a general
graph, the algorithms developed in Sections 4 and 5 are for the interesting special
case of one-sided fair bipartite matching problem, i.e., where G is bipartite (with
bipartition V = L ∪˙ R) and the set of users is given by U = L. By solving
the one-sided fair bipartite matching problem, we also obtain a polynomial time
maxmin-fair algorithm for matching in general graphs by means of a reduction to
the bipartite case (see Theorem 12).
3 Fairness and social inequality
In this section we present several properties of maxmin-fair distributions. These
are of independent interest as they provide alternative definitions of maxmin-
fairness (Theorems 1 and 2) which are arguably just as natural as Definition 1;
moreover, the latter offers insights into the inequality distribution properties of
maxmin-fairness. Some results are only stated here; their proofs may be found in
Appendix A.
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3.1 Basic properties of maxmin-fair distributions
An important preliminary observation is that maxmin-fair distributions are unique
as far as satisfaction probabilities go, even though several ways may exist to achieve
the optimal satisfaction probabilities.
Lemma 1 Let F and D be two maxmin-fair distributions. Then F [u] = D[u] for
all u ∈ U .
Example 3. In Example 2 we gave two maxmin-fair distributions, F1 and F2,
which are obtained by combining maximum matchings in different ways, but both
satisfy F1[a0] = F2[a0] = 1 and F1[x] = F2[x] =
2
3 for x ∈ {a1, a2, a3}.
Given a distribution D over S, write D ↑ = (λ1, . . . , λn) for the vector of
satisfaction probabilities (D[u])u∈U sorted in increasing order. Let ≻ denote the
lexicographical order of vectors: (v1, . . . , vn) ≻ (w1, . . . , wn) iff there is some index
i ∈ [n] such that vj = wj for all j < i and vi > wi (the relations ,≺ and  are
defined similarly). The following holds.
Theorem 1 A distribution F is maxmin-fair if and only if F ↑  D ↑ for all
distributions D over S.
In other words, a maxmin-fair distribution maximizes the smallest satisfaction
probability; subject to that, it maximizes the second-smallest satisfaction proba-
bility, and so on.
Example 4. In Examples 1 and 2 we have F1 ↑ = F2 ↑ = (1, 23 , 23 , 23 ) ≻
D ↑ = ( 23 , 23 , 23 , 23 ). As D ↑ is not lexicographically maximal, it cannot be maxmin-
fair; whereas F1 ↑ can be shown to be lexicographically maximal, and hence F1 is
maxmin-fair.
An important observation is that a maxmin-fair distribution always exists for
any search problem instance with a feasible solution:
Corollary 1 Given a search problem instance I = (U ,S), a maxmin-fair distri-
bution always exists.
Proof. The probability vectors defining distributions over S form a non-empty
compact set, and the mapping from such vectors to their corresponding sorted
satisfaction vectors is continuous, so the claim follows from Weirstrass theorem.
3.2 Matroid problems
Theorem 1 above provides a definition of maxmin-fairness alternative to Defini-
tion 1. At the end of this section (Theorem 2) we provide a second alternative
definition characterizing the inequality properties of the distribution of satisfac-
tion probabilities, i.e., the differences between the satisfaction of the least and most
satisfied individuals. It turns out that for a large class of problems, this difference
is minimized in a maxmin-fair distribution, making the maxmin-fair distribution
the most equitable. However this does not hold in general for all search problems.
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To be able to state the class of problems for which Theorem 2 holds, we need
to review the concept of matroids. Many search and optimization problems can
be formulated in terms of matroids; they also provide a convenient framework to
state and simplify the proofs of some of our results.
Definition 2 (Matroid problem) Let L be a finite set. A matroid with ground
set L is a non-empty collection M of subsets of L satisfying the following two
properties: (1) if A ∈M and B ⊆ A, then B ∈M ; (2) for any X ⊆ L, all maximal
subsets of X (with respect to set inclusion) belonging to M have the same size.
A search problem is a matroid problem if for any instance I = (U ,S), the set
S is a matroid. The elements of a matroid M are called independent sets. The
maximal elements of M are called bases. All bases have the same size. The rank
function of M is ρM (S) = max{|X| | X ⊆ S,X ∈M}.
Example 5. The following are matroids (see [45]):
– The collection of sets of matchable vertices in a graph [46]. This well-known
result follows from a theorem of Berge [4] that we may extend any matchable
set of vertices to a matchable set of maximum size. By contrast, the collections
of sets of edges forming a matching is not a matroid.
– The collection of sets of vertices in a graph for which edge-disjoint paths from
another single specified vertex exist.
– The collection of linearly independent sets of vectors over a finite vector space.
– The collection of forests (acyclic sets of edges) in a graph.
The search problems corresponding to finding any of the above are matroid prob-
lems.
Notice that any set X appearing with non-zero probability in a maxmin-fair
distribution must be maximum in size; otherwise, by property (2) in Definition 2,
X is not maximal so we could replace X with some strict superset Y ) X, which
can only increase the satisfaction probability of every u ∈ L. It is in this sense that
the “price of fairness” is zero for matroid problems: the support of a maxmin-fair
distribution consists only of solutions of maximum size, so it is never necessary to
trade fairness for solution size. In particular this holds for matching problems as
well.
3.3 Minmax-fairness
By definition, maxmin-fair distributions give the highest possible satisfaction prob-
abilities to the worst-off individuals. To investigate the inequality properties of
these, we introduce a dual notion of minmax-fair distributions, which by con-
trast give the lowest possible satisfaction probabilities to the best-off individuals.
It turns out that for matroid problems both notions coincide, provided that we
exclude Pareto-inefficient distributions.
Definition 3 (Pareto efficiency) A distribution E is (ex-ante) Pareto-efficient
if there is no distribution D such that D[u] ≥ E[u] for all u ∈ U and D[u] > E[u]
for at least one u ∈ U .
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The notion of Pareto-efficiency expresses the impossibility of improving the
satisfaction probability of some user without detriment to anyone else. Clearly
any maxmin-fair distribution is Pareto-efficient, hence any solution in its support
is maximal (with regard to set inclusion).
The notion of minmax-fairness outlined above requires that no user satisfaction
can be decreased without increasing that of another user which is no worse off, or
losing Pareto-efficiency.
Definition 4 A Pareto-efficient distribution F over S is minmax-Pareto (or min-
max fair) for U if for all Pareto-efficient distributions D over S and all u ∈ U , it
holds that
D[u] < F [u] =⇒ ∃v ∈ U | D[v] > F [v] ≥ F [u].
Requiring Pareto-efficiency is redundant for maxmin-fairness, but crucial for
minmax-Pareto efficiency; without it, the definition would be met by a distribution
of solutions satisfying nobody (for example, a solution which always returns the
empty matching).
In Appendix A we present analogues to Lemma 1 and Theorem 1 (Lemma 1
and Theorem 14) for minmax-fairness.
3.4 Inequality properties
The main result of this section, Theorem 2 is that, for matroid problems, the
notions of minmax fairness and maxmin fairness coincide; intuitively, any excess
satisfaction probability for the best-off user can be taken away from him and
redistributed to others. This also implies that the maxmin-fair solution minimizes
the largest gap in satisfaction probabilities; among those, it minimizes the second-
largest gap, etc.
Definition 5 The sorted inequality vector of a distribution D over S, written
D↓6=, is the vector of all pairwise differences in the satisfaction probabilities of the
elements of U under D, sorted in decreasing order.
Theorem 2 For matroid problems, the following are equivalent: (1) D is maxmin-
fair; (2) D is minmax-Pareto; (3) D is Pareto-efficient and D↓6=  E↓6= for all
Pareto-efficient distributions E over S.
The proof may be found in Appendix A.
Note that this result does not hold in general for non-matroid problems; the
following shows a counterexample.
Example 6. Consider the problem instance where the set of individuals is U =
{0, 1, 2, 3} and the set of feasible solutions is S = {{0, 1}, {1, 3}, {0, 2, 3}}. Here
elements 1 and 2 never appear together in a solution, so the minimum satisfaction
probability cannot exceed 12 . In order to achieve
1
2 we need to choose {0, 2, 3}
with probability exactly 12 ; this fixes the satisfaction probabilities of 2 and 1 to
1
2 , and to maximize the second-smallest probability we need to pick {0, 1} and
{1, 3} with probability 14 each. This is the maxmin-fair distribution D1 and its
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maximum inequality is 14 . However, a similar argument shows that the minmax-
fair distribution D2 is different: it uses each element of S with probability 13 and
has maximum inequality 13 .
Note that in this case one may verify that D1 still minimizes maximum in-
equality, but by considering the complements of each element of S, one can give a
similar example where the maxmin-fair distribution does not minimize inequality.
4 A polynomial-time algorithm for maxmin-fair matching
In this section we present our main contribution: a polynomial-time algorithm for
maxmin-fair matching. We present our algorithm for the one-sided fair bipartite
matching problem. This is the special case of fair matching where:
– G is bipartite (with bipartition V = L ∪˙ R),
– the set of users is U = L,
– there is a maximum matching covers all the right-side vertices but not all the
left-side vertices (i.e., ρ(L) = |R| < |L|),
– there are no degree-0 vertices (which can always be removed).
This setting corresponds to the job-search setting that we use in our examples
throughout the paper. We will see later (Section 5.2) that the general fair match-
ing problem in non-bipartite graphs, with arbitrary user sets U ⊆ V and with
no further restrictions, can be reduced to this special case in polynomial time.
Before presenting the building blocks of our algorithm in full detail, we provide an
overview of our techniques. Some results are only stated here; their proofs may be
found in Appendix B.
4.1 Overview of our techniques
We next provide an overview of how we obtain our main result: an efficient algo-
rithm for maxmin-fair bipartite matching.
(1) The first ingredient (Section 4.2) is a characterization of the fairness param-
eter, i.e., the maximum satisfaction probability which can be guaranteed for
every user. By using Hall’s theorem we prove (Corollary 2) that the fairness
parameter is determined by a “blocking” set of vertices with the smallest
neighborhood-to-size ratio. Unfortunately, the proof does not lead to an effi-
cient algorithm to find this set.
(2) Thus we proceed to write down a linear program for a fractional variant of
the problem (Section 4.3). Inspired by a technique developed by Charikar [14]
for the densest-subgraph problem, we show (Lemma 3) that any fractional
solution can be leveraged to find a blocking set of vertices. The neighbors of the
blocking set cannot be matched to any vertex outside the blocking set in any
maxmin-fair distribution. We use this fact to argue inductively (Theorem 5)
the existence of a “fair decomposition” of the set of left vertices with the
following property: vertices on higher levels can be allowed larger satisfaction
probabilities, regardless of which edges are used to match the vertices on lower
levels.
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(3) Having computed the assignment probabilities xuv (the probability of each
pair of vertices being matched) of some maxmin-fair distribution within each
block in the decomposition, we can turn each of them into an actual distri-
bution of matchings by finding the Birkhoff-von Neumann decomposition of a
doubly-stochastic matrix. Then we combine them into a single distribution.
(4) To obtain our faster algorithm (which also returns the exact optimal solution),
we avoid the use of linear programming and instead present a technique to find
several blocks in parallel with a single min-cut computation (Section 5). We
show that a logarithmic number of minimum cut computations suffice to obtain
the fair decomposition in full. Then we argue that given the decomposition
and satisfaction probabilities, the required distribution of matchings can be
found by coloring the edges of an appropriately constructed regular bipartite
graph, for which task we leverage the fast algorithm of Goel et al. [31].
4.2 Fairness parameter
We next ask the following important question: what is the minimum satisfaction
probability pi(G) of a maxmin-fair distribution for G? Hall’s marriage theorem
gives a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a matching covering
the whole of L, which is equivalent to having pi(G) = 1.
Theorem 3 (Hall [34]) In a bipartite graph with bipartition (L,R), the set L is
matchable if and only if |Γ (S)| ≥ |S| for all S ⊆ L.
We show a generalization of Hall’s theorem which will prove useful to charac-
terize the fairness parameter in bipartite matching.
Theorem 4 Let {αv | v ∈ L} be reals in [0, 1]. A necessary and sufficient condi-
tion for the existence of a distribution D of matchings of G such that D[v] ≥ αv
for all v ∈ L is
for all S ⊆ L, |Γ (S)| ≥
∑
v∈S
αv. (2)
Proof. Necessity is clear because no matching can cover more than |Γ (S)| ele-
ments of any set S, but the expected number of elements of S covered by D is∑
v∈S D[v] =
∑
v∈S αv by linearity of expectation.
For sufficiency, we may assume that all the αv are rational because (2) is a finite
set of inequalities with integral coefficients, so the maximizer of
∑
v βv subject to
|Γ (S)| ≥ ∑v∈S βv and βv ≥ αv will have βv ∈ Q. Let M be a suitable common
denominator, so that αu = βu = nu/M where M ≥ nu ∈ N. Construct a graph
G′ with
– nu replicas u
(1), . . . , u(nu) of each u ∈ L;
– M replicas v(1), . . . , v(m) of each v ∈ R;
– V (G′) = L′ ∪R′, where L′ = {u(i) | u ∈ L, i ≤ nu} and R′ = {v(i) | v ∈ R, i ≤
M}.
– E(G′) = {(u(i), v(j)) | (u, v) ∈ E(G), i ≤ nu, j ≤M}.
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This graph is bipartite with bipartition (L′, R′). Notice that vertices with αv = 0
have no replica in G′.
Consider (in G) the sets Ak = {u ∈ L | nu ≥ k} for k = 1, 2, . . . ,M . Given
k and a set S ⊆ Ak let S(k) = {u(k) | u ∈ S}. If A1 = ∅ the theorem is trivial.
Otherwise, let H1 denote the subgraph of G
′ induced by A
(1)
1 ∪R′. Any subset of
A′1 in H1 is of the form S
(1), for some S ⊆ A1. Using (2) we obtain
|ΓH1(S(1))| =M · |ΓG(S)| ≥
∑
u∈S
nu ≥ |S(1)|,
because nu ≥ 1 for u ∈ A1 ⊇ S. By Hall’s Theorem, there is a matching X1 in H1
covering A
(1)
1 .
If A2 6= ∅, let H2 denote the subgraph of G′ \ V (X1) induced by A(2)2 ∪R′. As
we removed the edges of the matching X1, the number of neighbours in G
′ of any
set S ⊆ A2 has decreased by at most |S|, so for any S ⊆ A2 he have
|ΓH2(S(2))| ≥M · |ΓG(S)| − |S| ≥
∑
u∈S
(nu − 1) ≥ |S(1)|,
because nu ≥ 2 for u ∈ A2 ⊇ S. Hence there is a matching X2 in H2 covering
A
(2)
2 . Proceeding similarly, we obtain a set of vertex-disjoint matchings in G
′ such
that their union is a matching X ′ in G′ covering L′. By restricting X ′ to each
replica of R in R′, we can decompose X ′ into M matchings X1, . . . , XM , each of
them inducing a matching in G. Furthermore, each u ∈ L is covered in exactly
nu of these, since X
′ covers L′. Thus the uniform distribution over X1, . . . , XM
yields coverage probability nu/M = αu for each u ∈ L.
The proof gives a maxmin-fair distribution which is uniform over a multiset of
M matchings, but M may be fairly large, as large as 2Ω(
√
|U|) in some instances.
Corollary 2 The minimum satisfaction probability in a maxmin-fair distribution
for the one-sided bipartite matching problem is
pi(G) = min
{ |Γ (S)|
|S| | ∅ 6= S ⊆ L
}
.
Proof. Fix a parameter λ ∈ [0, 1]. By Theorem 4, a distribution with satisfaction
probability at least λ for all L exists if and only if Γ (S) ≥ λ|S| for all S ⊆ V .
In Appendix B we prove a dual result for the maximum satisfaction probability:
Corollary 3 The maximum satisfaction probability in a maxmin-fair distribution
for the one-sided bipartite matching problem is
Π(G) = max
{ |Γ (L)| − |Γ (S)|
|L \ S| | S ( L
}
.
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4.3 A compact LP formulation for the fairness parameter
Below we write a linear program for computing pi(G).
minimize
∑
v∈R yv
s.t. yv − yu ≥ 0 ∀(u, v) ∈ E ⊆ L×R∑
u∈L yu = 1 ∀u ∈ L
yu, yv ≥ 0 ∀u ∈ L, v ∈ R
(3)
Any set S ⊆ L can be represented by a feasible solution to this LP by setting
yx =
1
|S| for all x ∈ S ∪ Γ (S).
Lemma 2 For any non-empty set S ⊆ L, there is a feasible solution to LP (3)
with value |Γ (S)||S| .
Proof. Define yx =
1
|S| for all x ∈ S∪Γ (S) and yx = 0 elsewhere. Then
∑
u∈L yu =∑
u∈S
1
|S| = 1 and for every edge (u, v) ∈ L× R we have either yu = 0 (in which
case yv ≥ 0 = yu) or yu = 1/|S|; the latter implies u ∈ S and v ∈ Γ (S), so yv =
1/|S| = yu. This proves feasibility. Finally, ∑v∈R yv =∑v∈Γ (S) 1|S| = |Γ (S)||S| .
The following shows how to round an optimal solution LP (3) to obtain a set
S of vertices such that |Γ (S)|/|S| equals the optimal value. A similar technique
has been used by Charikar [14] for the densest subgraph LP.
Lemma 3 Let {yw}w∈L∪R be an optimal solution to (3). Then the set S = {v ∈
L | yv > 0} 6= ∅ satisfies |Γ (S)||S| =
∑
v∈r yv.
Proof. Write λ =
∑
v∈R yv. For any r ∈ (0, 1), define S(r) = {u ∈ L | yu ≥ r} and
T (r) = {v ∈ R | yv ≥ r}. We show that T (r) = |Γ (S(r))| and |T (r)|/|S(r)| = λ
for every r ∈ (0, 1). To see this, observe that for any v ∈ R, yv ≥ maxu∈Γ−1(v) yu.
In fact in any optimal solution equality must hold: yv = maxu∈Γ−1(v) yu for all
v ∈ R; otherwise we may decrease some yv and hence the objective function
without sacrificing feasibility. Consequently,
v ∈ T (r)⇔ yv ≥ r ⇔ max
u∈Γ−1(v)
yu ≥ r ⇔
⇔ ∃u ∈ Γ−1(v) such that yu ≥ r ⇔ v ∈ Γ (S(r)).
Recall from Lemma 2 that we can construct a solution to LP (3) from any non-
empty set. Since λ is the optimal value of LP (3), for any r for which S(r) 6= ∅ we
have |T (r)|/|S(r)| ≥ λ, i.e., 0 ≤ |T (r)|−λ|S(r)|. The latter also holds if S(r) = ∅.
On the other hand, if we pick r uniformly at random from (0, 1), we have
E
r
[|S(r)|] =
∑
u
Pr
r
[u ∈ S(r)] =
∑
u
Pr
r
[r ≤ yu] =
∑
u
yu = 1,
E
r
[|T (r)|] =
∑
v
Pr
r
[v ∈ T (r)] =
∑
v
Pr
r
[r ≤ yv] =
∑
v
yv = λ,
so 0 ≤ Er[|T (r)| − λ|S(r)|] = Er[|T (r)|] − λ · Er[|S(r)|] = λ − λ · 1 = 0, which
implies that T (r)− λ ·S(r) = 0 almost surely when r is uniform in (0, 1). Observe
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that T (r)/S(r) is piecewise-constant in its domain (all distinct possibilities are
given by taking t = yw for some w ∈ L ∪R). Moreover, for any r ∈ (0, 1) there is
some interval I of non-zero length such that for all r′ ∈ I, then S(r) = S(r′) and
T (r) = T (r′). Thus, any event that is a measurable function of S(r) and T (r) and
holds with probability 1 when r ∼ U(0, 1) must actually hold for every r ∈ (0, 1)
as well.
Thus, |T (r)| = λ|S(r)| for all r ∈ (0, 1). In particular if we pick r0 = minu∈L yv,
then S(r0) = {v ∈ L | yv > 0} satisfies ∑v∈S(r0) yv = 1, hence is non-empty, and
by the above we have |Γ (S(r0))| − λ · |S(r0)| = 0, as desired.
In combination with Corollary 2, these two lemmas yield an effective method
of computing pi(G):
Corollary 4 In the one-sided fair bipartite matching problem, the fairness param-
eter pi(G) is equal to the optimum value of the LP in (3).
4.4 Fair decompositions
The next ingredient towards an efficient algorithm is to find a decomposition of L
according to different levels of satisfaction probability in the maxmin-fair distri-
bution. In Figure 2, the set of left vertices with smallest neighbor-to-size ratio is
the set B1 = {a5, a4}, with Γ (B1) = {b3}. By Corollary 2, the fairness parameter
of the graph in the picture is 12 . But in order to actually match a5 and a4 with
probability 12 , b3 must be matched to one of the two every single time. Hence
the edge (a3, b3) can never be used to in a maxmin-maxmin-fair solution. After
removing B1 and Γ (B1) from the graph, the next set of left vertices with smallest
neighbor-to-size ratio is the set B2 = {a1, a2, a3} and again we find that edge
(a0, b1) cannot be used. The last set we find in this way is B3 = {a0}.
We refer to B1, B2, B3 as the blocks of the fair decomposition; and to the
increasing sequence of sets S1 = B1, S2 = B1 ∪B2 and S3 = B1 ∪B2 ∪B3 as the
fairly isolated sets. This motivates the following definitions.
a0
a1
a2
a3
a4
a5
b0
b1
b2
b3
Fig. 2 A bipartite graph with blocks B1 = {a5, a4}, B2 = {a3, a2, a1} and B3 = {a0} and
fairly isolated sets S1 = B1, S2 = B1 ∪ B2 and S3 = B1 ∪B2 ∪ B3.
For A ⊆ L, denote by G|
A
the subgraph of G induced by A ∪ Γ (A), and by
G/A the subgraph of G induced by (L∪R)\(A∪Γ (A)). Intuitively,G|
A
represents
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the subproblem where only the elements of A are important, and G/A represents
the subproblem of G|
A
where the use of neighbours of A is disallowed. For any
subgraph H of G, let pi(H) (resp., Π(H)) be the minimum (resp., maximum)
satisfaction probability of an element of V (H) ∩ L in a maxmin-fair distribution.
The nonempty set X ⊆ L is fairly isolated if Π(G|
X
) < pi(G/X) or X = L.
This means that every u /∈ X has guaranteed satisfaction larger than the largest
maxmin-fair satisfaction inside X, even if we remove all possibly conflicting edges
from X to Γ (X).
Finding fairly isolated sets enables a “divide and conquer” strategy to find
maxmin-fair distributions, since it turns out that matchings used inside X have
no bearing on the satisfactions needed for users in L \X. For example, if we can
determine that the set B1 ∪B2 is fairly isolated, then we can work independently
on B1 ∪B2 and B3 and combine the distributions found.
With this in mind, we are ready to state our fair decomposition theorem, proved
in Appendix B:
Theorem 5 The fairly isolated sets form a chain S1 ⊆ S2 . . . ⊆ Sk−1 ⊆ Sk = L.
Define S0 = ∅ for convenience and let Bi = Si \Si−1 for i > 0. The following hold
for all i = 1, . . . , k:
(a) Bi is the maximal set X ⊆ L \ Si minimizing |Γ (X∪Si)|−|Γ (Si)||X| .
(b) If i < k, Bi is the maximal set X ⊆ Si+1 maximizing |Γ (Si+1)|−|Γ (Si+1\X)||X| .
(c) The satisfaction probability of every v ∈ Bi in any maxmin-fair distribution is
λi =
|Γ (Bi)\Γ (Si−1)|
|Bi|
, and any w ∈ Γ (Bi)\Γ (Si−1) is matched to some u ∈ Bi
with probability 1.
We call B1, . . . , Bk the blocks in the fair decomposition of G.
4.5 Description of the basic algorithm
Theorem 5 and Lemma 3 suggest a line of attack to solve the one-sided fair bi-
partite matching problem, outlined in Algorithm 1 below. First, find the blocks
B1, . . . , Bk in a fair decomposition. Second, find a maxmin-fair distribution
1 Di
for each block Bi, using only edges that do not “cross to neighbors of lower blocks”
(i.e., no edge is allowed from u ∈ Bi to v ∈ Γ (Bj) where j < i). Finally, combine
the distributions into a single maxmin-fair distribution D, and draw a matching
from it. Both our algorithms follow this general outline; they differ in how to per-
form steps 1 and 2. (We will discuss later (Section 7) an alternative implementation
of step 3 which leads to distributions over a smaller number of matchings.)
Next we give the details of our first algorithm (Algorithm 2).
Step 1: Finding a fair decomposition. We will find the blocks in a bottom-up
manner. To find the first block, observe the following:
Lemma 4 The maximal set minimizing |Γ (X)|/|X| is the union of all non-empty
sets X minimizing |Γ (X)|/|X|.
1 Each of these distributions can be represented by a list of pairs (probability,matching),
with the probabilities being non-negative and summing up to 1. For our second algorithm a
simpler representation is possible: the distribution of matchings Di within each block (but not
for the whole graph) is uniform over some small multiset of matchings.
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Algorithm 1: Outline of our polynomial-time algorithms for maxmin-fair
matching
Input: Bipartite graph G = (V, E) with bipartition V = L ∪˙ R and with |ρ(L)| = R
Output: A maximum matching in G drawn from a maxmin-fair distribution
1 Function MaxminFairMatching(G, L, R)
/* Step 1: find a fair decomposition */
2 B1, . . . , Bk = FairDecomposition(G, L, R)
/* Step 2: obtain a fair decomposition for each block */
3 for i = 1, . . . , k do
4 Ri = Γ (Bi) \
⋃
j<i Γ (Bj)
5 Gi = subgraph of G induced by Bi and Ri
6 Di = SingleBlockDistribution(Gi , Li, Ri)
/* Step 3: combine the distributions and pick a matching */
7 for i = 1, . . . , k do
8 Mi = draw a matching from Di
9 return
⋃k
i=1Mi
Proof. It suffices to show that if X,Y are non-empty sets minimizing |Γ (X)|/|X|,
then X ∪ Y also minimizes |Γ (X)|/|X|. Indeed, suppose |Γ (Y )||Y | = |Γ (X)||X| , λ. By
the submodularity of the cardinality of the neighborhood function of a graph,
|Γ (X ∪ Y )|+ |Γ (X ∩ Y )| ≤ |Γ (X)|+ |Γ (Y )| = λ(|X|+ |Y |).
Notice that |Γ (X ∪ Y )| ≥ λ|X ∪ Y | and |Γ (X ∩ Y )| ≥ λ|X ∩ Y | by definition. If
any of these two inequalities were strict we would have the contradiction
|Γ (X ∪ Y )|+ |Γ (X ∩ Y )| > λ(|X ∪ Y |+ |X ∩ Y |) = λ(|X|+ |Y |).
Hence the inequalities are not strict, and |Γ (X ∪ Y )| = λ|X ∪ Y |.
Along with Theorem 5, this observation suggests the following method, de-
scribed in the FindBlocks method of Algorithm 2. By solving the LP in (3) and
using Lemma 3, we obtain a set X minimizing |Γ (S)|/|S|. Remove X from the
graph G and repeat (if G is non-empty); let Y be the new set obtained. If
Γ (Y )/|Y | = Γ (X)/|X|, then replace X with X ′ = X ∪ Y and repeat the pro-
cess of finding a minimizer Y via LP (3); this strictly increases the size of X.
Eventually we will obtain a Y satisfying |Γ (Y )|/|Y | > Γ (X)/|X|, at which point
we know that X is the maximal set minimizing Γ (S)/|S|, i.e., the first non-trivial
block B1 is X. Now remove B1 and Γ (B1) from G and repeat (if applicable) to
obtain B2, . . . , Bk.
Step 2: Obtaining a fair distribution for each block. The idea of this step
is first to calculate the assignment probabilities xuv for all u ∈ L, v ∈ R, i.e., the
probability that u is matched to v in some fixed maxmin-fair distribution F . As
of yet these probabilities are unknown (and, unlike satisfaction probabilities, they
need not be the same for all maxmin-fair distributions). However, we do know
some conditions that they must satisfy because we know (from Theorem 5) the
satisfaction probabilities of the left vertices in F , and all the right vertices need
to be matched with probability 1 under our assumption that ρ(L) = |R|. These
conditions may be expressed as linear constraints in xuv, so we will find suitable
values for xuv via a linear program. Finally we can turn these values into an actual
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Algorithm 2: First polynomial-time algorithm for maxmin-fair matching
Input: Bipartite graph G = (V, E) with bipartition V = L ∪˙ R
1 Function SmallestRatioSet(G, L, R)
2 Solve LP (3) for the subgraph of G induced by L and R
3 S = {v ∈ L | yv > 0}
4 λ =
∑
v∈R yv
5 return S, λ
6 Function FairDecomposition(G, L, R)
7 k = 0
8 L′, R′ = L,R
9 while L′ 6= ∅ do
10 X, λ′ = SmallestRatioSet(G, L′, R′)
11 L′ = L′ \X
12 if k = 0 or λ′ 6= λ then
/* Create new block, possibly incomplete */
13 k = k + 1
14 Bk , λ = X, λ
′
15 R′ = R′ \ ΓG(Bk) /* Remove the neighbors of the previous block */
16 else
/* Merge with an existing block */
17 Bk = Bk ∪X
18 return B1, . . . , Bk
19 Function SingleBlockDistribution(G, L,R)
20 F = a set of |L| − |R| new right vertices
21 N = {(i, j) | i ∈ L, j ∈ F}
22 Add the new vertices F and new edges N to G to form G′
/* LP to find assignment probabilities */
23 Find non-negative values xuv such that
∑
j∈Γ
G′
(i) xij = 1 for all j ∈ L ∪R.
/* Birkhoff-von Neumann decomposition */
24 Find a distribution D of matchings using edge (u, v) with probability xuv.
25 Remove from each matching in D the incident to F
26 return D
distribution of matchings via the Birkhoff-von Neumann decomposition. Details
follow.
Consider the graph Hi = G/
⋃
j≤i Bj obtained by removing all lower blocks
and their neighbors. To simplify notation, rename L∩ V (Hi) and R∩ V (Hi) to L
and R. We have |R| ≤ |L| and λ = |R|/|L| ≤ 1. First we calculate the (as of yet
unknown) probabilities xij (i ∈ L, j ∈ R) that each edge (i, j) is saturated (i.e.,
i is matched to j) in some fixed maxmin-fair distribution. Clearly
∑
j xij = λ
for each i and
∑
i xij = 1 for each j. Let us add a set Z of |L| − |R| fictitious
vertices to R and extend the domain of definition of xij so as to satisfy xij =
1/|L| for each i ∈ L, j ∈ Z. We obtain a bipartite graph G′ with |L| vertices on
each side; let Γ ′ denote its neighborhood function. Then
∑
v∈Γ ′(u) xuv = 1 ∀u ∈
L,
∑
u∈Γ ′(v) xuv = 1 ∀v ∈ R ∪ Z, and xuv ≥ 0 ∀u ∈ L, v ∈ R ∪ Z. We can find a
solution xuv to these inequalities by solving a linear program.
By the following consequence of Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem on doubly
stochastic matrices [7] the quantities xuv thus obtained represent the edge satu-
ration probabilities of an actual distribution of matchings in G′:
Lemma 5 Let {xuv}(u,v)∈E be non-negative numbers s.t.
∑
v∈R xuv ≤ 1 ∀u ∈ L
and
∑
u∈L xuv ≤ 1 ∀v ∈ R. Then a distribution over |E|+ 1 matchings such that
PrM∈M[(u, v) ∈M ] = xuv exists and may be found in polynomial time.
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We thus obtain a distribution D of matchings in G′ in which each edge (u, v)
is used with probability xuv. If we pick each matching with its probability in D
and remove from it the edges incident to the ”fictitious“ elements in Z, we obtain
a distribution of matchings where each element i of L is matched with probability
1−∑j∈Z xij = 1− (|Z|/|L|) = 1− (|L| − |R|)/|L| = λ, as desired.
Step 3: Combining the distributions. The last step requires combining the
distributions D1, . . . , Dk, each defined for a block Bi, into a single maxmin-fair
distribution for G. The simplest way is to draw (M1, . . . ,Mk) from the product
distribution D1 × D2 . . . × Dk and return M1 ∪M2 . . . ∪Mk. (This is an easily
samplable maxmin-fair distribution with potentially large support.)
Putting all together, we obtain the following.
Theorem 6 Algorithm 2 is a polynomial-time algorithm for the one-sided maxmin-
fair matching problem.
5 A more efficient algorithm
The algorithm from Section 4 requires solving polynomially many LP subprob-
lems. It was presented to showcase the main steps required, to introduce the fair
decompositions, and to establish the existence of a polynomial-time algorithm. In
this section we analyze a more efficient algorithm. It also follows each of the three
steps outlined in Algorithm 1, but differs from Algorithm 2 in two key respects:
– For step 1, it finds fairly separated sets in arbitrary order, rather than bottom-
up. These sets can be found by maximum flow computations in a certain graph,
and a single flow computation can be used to find many new blocks in the
decomposition simultaneously.
– For step 2, it uses a fast edge-coloring algorithm on a carefully constructed reg-
ular bipartite graph, allowing us to bypass the (comparatively slow) Birkhoff-
von Neumann decomposition (for which the best known algorithm from [31]
runs in ω(|V ||E|) time).
We present pseudocode for the improved algorithm (Algorithm 3) at the end
of this section. We establish the following:
Theorem 7 Algorithm 3 solves the maxmin-fair one-sided bipartite matching prob-
lem in O((|V |2 + |E||V |2/3) · (log |V |)2) expected time.
5.1 Improved step 1: Finding a fair decomposition
Suppose we wish to separate L into vertices with satisfaction probability < λ
and vertices with satisfaction probability ≥ λ, for some parameter λ ∈ (0, 1). To
perform this check, construct the graph G(λ) by adding to G a source vertex s
connected to every u ∈ L with an edge of capacity λ, and a sink vertex t connected
to every v ∈ R with an edge of capacity 1; all other edges have infinite capacity.
Lemma 6 Let κ be the value of a minimum s−t cut in G(λ). Then exactly one of
the following cases holds: (a) κ = λ|L| and pi(G) ≥ λ; or (b) κ < λ|L| and there is
a fairly-isolated subset X ( L such that Π(G|
X
) < λ. We can determine which
case occurs, and obtain X in case (b), with a min-cut computation on G(λ).
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Recall that pi(G) (resp., Π(G)) represents the minimum (resp., maximum) sat-
isfaction probabilities in a maxmin-fair distribution forG. In either of the two cases
contemplated by Lemma 6 we have “made progress” by solving a min-cut problem
on G(λ); either (a) we showed that achieving minimum satisfaction probability λ
is possible, or (b) found a fair separation (and a reason why it is not possible).
Proof. Consider a minimum-value s− t cut in G(λ). Because the capacities of the
edges from s are no larger than any other capacity, there is always a cut C with
no larger value containing no edges from L to R. C only contains edges from s to
some subset AL ⊆ L and from some subset AR ∈ R to t; its value is λ|AL|+ |AR|.
Let AL = L \ AL and AR = R \ AR. Because C is an s, t-cut, there are no
edges in G (or in G(λ)) between AL and AR, so Γ (AL) ⊆ AR. As C is a minimum
cut, we must in fact have Γ (AL) = AR (or else cutting some edges from AR to t
is unnecessary). The value of C is λ|AL|+ |AR|. Furthermore, for any X ⊆ AL we
must have |Γ (X) \ Γ (AL)| ≥ λ|X|, for otherwise there would be a cut of smaller
value
λ|AL \X|+ |Γ (AL ∪X)| = (λ|AL|+ |AR|)− λ|X|+ |Γ (X) \ AR|.
So the fairness parameter pi(G/AL) is at least λ. If AL = ∅, this is pi(G) and we
are in case (a) of the Lemma.
If AL 6= ∅, let C = C(λ) be the minimum cut with minimum |AL|. Then AL
is unique and may be determined in linear time by picking the vertices reachable
from s in the residual network of a maximum (pre)flow [50]. For any Y ⊆ AL, we
must have |Γ (AL)| − |Γ (AL \ Y )| < λ|Y |, otherwise another cut C ′ of at most
the same same value but with |A′L| < |AL| would exist. Hence Π(G|AL) < λ by
Corollary 3 which, along with the previously derived inequality pi(G/AL) ≥ λ,
states that AL is a fairly separated set, and we are in case (b).
The parametric flow algorithm of Gallo et al [30] can find the cuts C(λ) in
the proof of Lemma 6 simultaneously for all λ (in the sense of giving a cut for all
possible |L| − 1 “breakpoints” for λ). Its running time is asymptotically the same
time as that of a single maximum-flow computation via the push-relabel algorithm
of [33]. However, this technique does not extend to all max-flow algorithms, and [33]
is suboptimal for the graphs G(λ). A better idea is the following (see Algorithm 3).
Start with λ = 1 and keep halving λ as long as case (a) holds in Lemma 6. The
first time that (b) occurs we have found a fairly separated set X. At this point
we can find recursively the blocks in the fair decompositions of G|
X
and G/X.
The crucial insight is that we can find both in a single recursive call : G|
X
and
G/X are disjoint, so min-cuts for (G|
X
)(λ1) and (G/X)(λ2) are easily obtained
from min-cuts for a single graph G(λ1, λ2;X,X) containing a disjoint copy of each
(except that we still keep a single source s and a single sink t).
An iterative implementation of this idea maintainins the following invariant:
(a) we keep a partition of L into t ≤ k subsets T1, . . . , Tt;
(b) each Ti is the union of consecutive blocks in the decomposition (in other words,
it is the difference between two fairly isolated sets);
(c) we have computed lower and upper bounds λi and µi for the maxmin-fair
probabilities of vertices in Ti, i.e., [pi(Ti), Π(Ti)] ⊆ [λi, µi);
(d) these bounds satisfy µi − λi = 2−j at iteration j ≥ 0.
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Initially, t = 1, T1 = L, λ1 = 0, µ1 = 1 (valid by the assumption ρ(L) < |L|),
and j = 0. Construct the graph G(λ′1, . . . , λ
′
t;T1, . . . , Tt) where the edge capacities
from s to each u ∈ Ti are λ′i = (λi + µi)/2, and edges from u ∈ Ti to v ∈ Γ (Tj)
where j 6= i are deleted. With a min-cut computation in G(λ′1, . . . , λ′t;T1, . . . , Tt)
we reduce the range of parameter bounds within Ti by half for each i, and possibly
split Ti into two (increasing t) if we found a new fairly separated set. After the
min-cut computation, obtaining the new partition of L, the new upper bounds,
and removing the edges from lower blocks to higher ones takes linear time.
After O(log |L|) iterations (each performing a min-cut and a linear-time up-
date), we have µi−λi < 1/|L|2 for all i, at which point we have determined the full
decomposition (because each maxmin-fair satisfaction probability is of the form
a/b where a ≤ b, 1 ≤ b ≤ |L|). The running time of the max-flow algorithm of [32]
for bipartite networks with rational capacities with denominators bounded by a
polynomial in |V | is O(min(|E|3/2, |E||V |2/3) · log |V |). We obtain:
Theorem 8 The fair decomposition of a graph G = (V,E) for the one-sided
fair bipartite matching problem can be found in time O(min(|E|3/2, |E||V |2/3) ·
(log |V |)2).
5.2 Improved step 2: Obtaining a fair distribution for each block
Here we describe the procedure in Algorithm 3 to find fair distributions once the
fair decomposition has been computed. As before, suppose that G itself has a
single block, so Γ (L) = λ|R|. Let g = gcd(|L|, |R|) and l = |L|/g, r = |R|/g.
Let G(λ) be as in Lemma 6. By the max-flow/min-cut theorem, there is a flow
in G(λ) with of value λ|L| = |R|. Since the incoming edges to any u ∈ L from s
have capacity λ, the flow from s to v must be precisely λ. Let xuv be flow between
u ∈ L and v ∈ R. Then ∑u∈L xuv = λ = lr and ∑v∈R xuv = 1, so we found the
edge saturation probabilities {xuv} of a maxmin-fair distribution.
Consider now the subgraph G′ of G containing only those edges for which
xuv > 0. By Lemma 5, the same edge probabilities xuv warrant the existence of a
distribution of matchings in G′ with satisfaction probability λ.
By the integral flow theorem [45], each xuv may be assumed to be a multiple
of 1/r, because all capacities in G′ are multiples of 1/r; in fact any standard
maximum-flow algorithm returns such a solution. Now consider the (r, l)-biregular
multigraph P obtained by putting nuv = xuv · r parallel edges between u ∈ L
and v ∈ R. As in step 2 of Sec. 4.5, we add to the right side of P a set Z of
|L \ R| vertices. Joining the ith vertex of L with the jth vertex of Z whenever
i ≡ j mod g, we obtain from P a graph P ′ which is bipartite and l-regular.
Any bipartite graph of maximum degree l is l-edge-colorable so that no two
adjacent edges share a color by Ko˝nig’s theorem (see [46]). Each color class is a
matching, so there are l matchings in P ′ covering each u ∈ L exactly l times in
total. Cole et al [18] give an algorithm to color regular bipartite graphs in time
O(m log r) = O(m log |Γ (L)|), where m is the number of edges of P ′; in our case
m = O(l · |E(G)|). Goel et al [31] give a randomized algorithm to color l-regular
bipartite graphs in expected time O(ln2 log2(n)), where n is the number of vertices
of P ′; in our case n = O(|L|) and we can use the crude bound l ≤ |L|, so it runs
in O(|L|2 log2(|L|)). If we remove the “fictitious” vertices in Z from each of these
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Algorithm 3: Improved (faster) polynomial-time algorithm for maxmin-fair
matching
Input: Bipartite graph G = (V, E) with bipartition V = L ∪˙ R
1 Function FairDecomposition(G, L, R)
2 t = 1 /* number of sets */
3
4 T1 = L
5 λ1, µ1 = 0, 1
6 while µ1 − λ1 ≥
1
|L|2
do
7 Construct the graph G′ = G
(λ1+µ1
2
, . . . , λt+µt
2
; T1, . . . , Tt
)
as in the
discussion preceding Theorem 8
8 Run a max flow algorithm on G′
9 X = set of vertices reachable from s in the residual flow
10 p = t
11 for i = 1, . . . , p do
12 Xi = X ∩ Ti
13 if Xi 6= ∅ then
/* Separation found; split Ti into two */
14 Tt+1, λt+1, µt+1 = Ti \Xi,
λi+µi
2
, µi
15 Ti, λi, µi = Xi, λi,
λi+µi
2
16 Remove from G the edges between Tt+1 and Γ (Ti)
17 t = t+ 1
18 else
/* Separation not found; update lower bound on pi(Ti) */
19 λi =
λi+µi
2
20 return T1, . . . , Tt
21 Function SingleBlockDistribution(G, L,R)
22 g = gcd(|L|, |R|)
23 l = |L|/g
24 r = |R|/g
25 Construct the graph H = G(λ) as in Lemma 6
26 Find a maximum flow in H; let xuv denote the flow between x ∈ L and v ∈ R
27 Construct a multigraph P with xuv · r edges between each pair (u, v) ∈ L× R
28 F = a set of |L| − |R| new right vertices
29 Add to the right side of P the vertices in F
30 N = {(i, j) | i ∈ L, j ∈ F, i ≡ j (mod r)}
31 Add the edges in N to P
32 C1, . . . , Cl = color classes in an l-coloring of the edges of P
33 Remove from C1, . . . , Cl the edges incident to F
34 D = the uniform distribution over C1, . . . , Cl
35 return D
matchings, we are left with a multiset of l matchings in G covering each u ∈ L
exactly r times. The uniform distribution over them is thus maxmin-fair for G.
Now consider the case that the decomposition ofG has several blocksB1, . . . , Bk.
The values xiuv for all blocks i can be computed from a single maximum-flow
computation in G(λ1, . . . , λk;B1, . . . , Bk) if we know the blocks and each satis-
faction probability λi. Then each corresponding coloring can be found in time
O(n2i log
2(ni)); summing these running times and noticing that
∑
i n
2
i ≤ |L|2, we
deduce:
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Theorem 9 Given the fair decomposition, a maxmin-fair distribution for all blocks
in it can be found in O(|V |2 · (log |V |)2) expected time and O(|V ||E| log |V |) de-
terministic time after a max-flow computation.
Putting all together yields Theorem 7.
6 Generalization to non-bipartite graphs
Recall that so far we have concerned ourselves with the one-sided fair bipartite
matching problem, i.e., the special case of fair matching where G is bipartite (with
bipartition V = L ∪˙ R) and the set of users is U = L.
Notably, this special case can encode any other matching problem, and more-
over we can make the simplifying assumption that L is matchable and larger than
R. To show this, we make use of the following result from transversal theory.
Theorem 10 (Ford and Fulkerson [26]) For any graph G there exists a bipar-
tite graph H with bipartition (LH , RH) such that LH = V (G) and the collection of
matchable subsets of V (G) in G equals the collection of matchable subsets of LH
in H.
This is normally stated as “any matching matroid is transversal”. The con-
struction of H in Theorem 10 can be carried out in polynomial time (see [54] for a
simple proof). Hence the case of non-bipartite G can be reduced to the one-sided
bipartite case. A similar remark applies to general user sets U ⊆ V , as we can
remove from LH the elements of V \ U , which has no effect on the collection of
matchable subsets of U in H.
We make the additional simplifying assumption that R is matchable. If not,
find an arbitrary maximum matching of G and remove from R all unmatched
vertices. Let R′ denote the remaining vertices.
Theorem 11 (Mendelsohn and Dulmage [21]) If both A ⊆ L and B ⊆ R
are matchable in a bipartite graph G with bipartition (L,R), then A ∪ B is also
matchable in G.
It follows that for each distribution of matchings of G there is another dis-
tribution with the same coverage (satisfaction) probabilities for L and covering
only elements of L ∪ R′. Note that the coverage probability of each v ∈ R′ in
this distribution is 1. The case where ρ(L) = |R| is easily handled separately (any
maximum matching algorithm is maxmin-fair in this case), yielding the following
(see Appendix B for details):
Theorem 12 The fair matching problem on arbitrary graphs with arbitrary user
sets U ⊆ V can be reduced in polynomial time to the one-sided fair bipartite match-
ing problem on graphs where ρ(L) = |R| < |L|.
Proof. Let A be a maxmin-fair algorithm for one-sided bipartite matching problem
described. Given a graph G and a user set U , we
(1) construct H as in Theorem 10;
(2) remove from LH the elements of V (G) \ U ;
(3) find an arbitrary maximum matching M and remove from RH the elements
not covered by M , using any polynomial-time maximum matching algorithm.
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(4) find a fair one-sided bipartite matching by either (a) using A on the resulting
graph if |M | < |LH | or (b) returning M if |M | = |LH |;
(5) given the solution S found at the previous step, return a matching in G cover-
ing the same vertices as S using an explicit algorithm for Berge’s theorem [24].
(Step (5) is technically redundant as we identify solutions with sets of matchable
users, but is included for clarity.)
It is plain to see that the resulting distribution is maxmin-fair for the general
problem if and only if A is maxmin-fair for the one-sided problem. All steps run
in polynomial time, possibly excluding the call to A itself.
Combining Theorems 7 and 12, we obtain the following.
Theorem 13 The maxmin-fair matching problem on general unweighted graphs
is solvable in polynomial time.
7 On transparency and practical deployment
Even a provably fair algorithm might still be perceived by the average user as
a blackbox outputting an arbitrary solution. For the sake of transparency and
accountability, it can be interesting to publish all the solutions in a maxmin-
fair distribution (along with their respective probabilities). Once a complete fair
distribution is published, convincing any user u of fair treatment amounts to:
(1) letting u verify independently the fairness guarantees of the distribution (for
this it is also possible to output a short certificate, based on the fair decompo-
sition, of the fact that no higher probability for u is possible in a maxmin-fair
distribution); and
(2) picking one of the published solutions at random, via any fair and transpar-
ent lottery mechanism or coin-tossing protocol (this is the only stage where
randomness plays a role, as the distribution of matchings itself can be found
deterministically).
One difficulty is the potentially large support size of the maxmin-fair distribu-
tion, which could prevent publication. An interesting question is if we can produce
a maxmin-fair distribution with small support. It turns out that for matchings,
|L| − 1 solutions always suffice; although the actual number can be substantially
smaller in practice (as shown in Section 8).
Let us discuss how to modify our algorithm so as to find a maxmin-fair distri-
bution F using at most |L|+1−k matchings, where k is the number of non-trivial
blocks in Theorem 5. (This could replace step 3 of Algorithm 1.) When k = 1, the
technique from step 2 of Algorithm 3 gives a multiset of l ≤ |L| matchings.
Consider the case k = 2, which implies our claim for larger k by induction.
Suppose D (resp., D′) chooses matching Mi, i ∈ [r] on B1 (resp., Nj , j ∈ [t] on
B2) with probability pi (resp., qj). (Here B1∩B2 = ∅.) A simple greedy algorithm
can construct a distribution Z of matchings in B1 ∪B2 such that D[u] = Z[u] for
u ∈ B1 and D′[u] = Z[u] for u ∈ B2 with at most r + t− 1 matchings, as follows.
Keep indices i ∈ [r], j ∈ [t] and let S denote a set of (probability, matching)
pairs, which will define the desired distribution at the end. At the outset S = ∅
and i = j = 1; at each iteration we add to S the new pair (δ,Mi ∪ Nj) where
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δ = min(pi, qj). We decrement pi and qj by δ and increment i (resp., j) if pi (resp,
qj) vanishes. The process terminates when i and j reach the end of their range, at
which point |S| = r + t− 1 and all probabilities in S sum up to 1.
We note, however, that this procedure may produce some matchings with very
small probabilities, so the precision needed to specify a maxmin-fair distribution
exactly will grow.
8 Experimental evaluation
We evaluate the practical performance of our fair matching algorithm by measur-
ing its running time and its ability to scale to large graphs, and analyzing the
distribution of maxmin-fair satisfaction probabilities and how they compare with
those from two baselines. We also describe the features of the fair decompositions
obtained.
Reproducibility.Our code is available at https://github.com/elhipercubo/maxmin_fair_bipartite_matching.git.
It implements the improved algorithm from Sec. 5, with some implementation
choices described below. It was compiled with g++ using -O3 optimizations and
run on a dual-core Intel i7-7560U CPU (2.40 GHz) with 16Gb RAM.
Datasets. We used publicly-available bipartite graphs of various types, sizes and
domains: all the graphs are already bipartite at the source repository, so that no
preprocessing was needed. Table 2 reports their main characteristics.
Methods tested. We compare the following four methods to output maximum
matchings:
(UF) Unfair : A standard maximum matching algorithm using maximum flows,
optimized for runtime using the techniques from [17]. We use it for runtime
comparisons only, because such a deterministic mechanism is inherently unfair
as argued in Section 1.
(MF) Maxmin fair : Our mechanism, using the improved algorithm from Sec. 5.
(PS) Probabilistic Serial (from [8]): The goal here is to find a set of edge flows
from L to R which can be converted into a matching distribution by using the
Birkhoff-von Neumann decomposition.
PS attempts to find a fair flow via a greedy algorithm, as follows: each user
u ∈ L sends flow at the same fixed rate, sharing this rate equally among her
neighbours. When the outgoing flow of u ∈ L (or the ingoing flow of v ∈ R)
reaches 1, remove u (or v). Repeat while there are edges remaining.
Unlike MF, this mechanism is not Pareto-efficient (i.e., it does not necessarily
return maximum matchings), but like MF, a single run of the mechanism can
be used to output all satisfaction probabilities.
(RP) Random Priority (see [8]): It finds a matchable set of vertices as follows:
Let S = ∅. Process all users in random order, adding user u to S if S ∪ {u} is
matchable. Return a matching covering the final set S.
Like MF, this mechanism is Pareto-efficient, but unlike MF, a single run of
the mechanism only outputs a single matching and hence cannot be used to
compute all satisfaction probabilities.
The latter two methods arose from work in economics in a different setting: ran-
domized assignments on full bipartite graphs with ordinal preferences, i.e., where
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every u ∈ L has a full ranking of all possible partners v ∈ R, and the goal is to
design mechanisms which are ordinally efficient. (By contrast, in our setting the
graph is not complete but there are no ordinal preferences: each user considers all
of its neighbours equally desirable.) However they can be naturally applied in our
context as well.
Implementation. We used the improved algorithm from Sec. 5. For max flow
computations we chose the highest-label push-relabel algorithm of [33], which
performs best with the gap heuristic from [16]. We follow Goldberg techniques
from [17]: efficient gap detection is done via bucket lists of active nodes at each
level [17], and we arrange edges from/to the same vertex consecutively to take
advantage of cache locality. We avoid floating-point computations by using exact
integral multipliers.
For reasons of simplicity and/or practical efficiency, our implementation de-
parts from the pseudocode in Algorithm 3 in the points below. None of these
changes affect correctness.
– In FairDecomposition (line 8), only a pre-flow algorithm (the first phase
of [33]) is run. This always suffices to find min-cuts (not max-flows) and thus
fairly separated sets, and can halve the runtime.
– In FairDecomposition (line 7), instead of setting λ′i = (λi + µi)/2 when
building the graph G(λ′1, . . . , λ
′
t;T1, . . . , Tt), we set it to |Γ (Ti)|/|Ti|. That is,
our implementation guesses optimistically that Ti is actually a single block in
the decomposition, with the pre flow computation used to verify that guess or
split the block in two. This also allows us to change the terminating condition
(line 6) and stop earlier: rather than stopping when λi and µi are very close,
which may occur long after the full decomposition have been found, we stop
when no block is split. This new choice for λ′i may invalidate our theoretical
bound on the number of flow computations required, but it makes the code
much faster in practice.
– In SingleBlockDistribution (lines 27–32), we do not always build P because
P may be quite large for some blocks with a small number of right vertices
(where r ≪ l), due to the fictitious edges added. Rather, we first attempt to
find l disjoint matchings of size r in arbitrary order without including fictitious
vertices/edges. This often succeeds and, when it does, gives a correct coloring.
When this fails, we build P and proceed to find the coloring as described.
– In SingleBlockDistribution (line 32), we do not use Goel et al’s edge col-
oring algorithm on P . Rather, we find l matchings of size l one by one. This
simplifies the implementation, but may impact performance and the runtime
bound.
8.1 Fair decompositions: characteristics
Table 3 shows the number of blocks k in the fair decomposition (for informative
purposes), the number of distinct edges e1 used in a maxmin-fair distribution F ,
the number of matchings M in the support of F , and the time to compute the
decomposition. As we anticipated in Section 7 the number of matchings needed for
a fair distribution (M) is in practice much smaller than |L|. Another observation is
that e1 exceeds |L| only slightly. This is a measure of the storage needed to publish
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Table 2 Datasets used: code, number of left and right nodes (|L|, |R|), number of edges (|E|),
maximum matching size (ρ). Available at: http://konect.uni-koblenz.de/networks/
dataset (code) |L| |R| |E| ρ
actor-movie (AM) 127,823 383,640 1,470,404 114,762
pics-ti (Vui) 82,035 495,402 2,298,816 67,608
citeulike-ti (Cti) 153,277 731,769 2,411,819 120,125
bibsonomy-2ti (Bti) 204,673 767,477 2,555,080 152,757
wiki-en-cat (WC) 1,853,493 182,947 3,795,796 179,546
movielens (M3) 69,878 10,677 10,000,054 10,544
flickr (FG) 395,979 103,631 8,545,307 96,866
dblp-author (Pa) 1,425,813 4,000,150 8,649,016 1,425,803
discogs-aff (Di) 1,754,823 270,771 14,414,659 248,796
edit-dewiki (de) 425,842 3,195,148 57,323,775 355,045
livejournal (LG) 3,201,203 7,489,073 112,307,385 2,171,971
trackers (WT) 27,665,730 12,756,244 140,613,762 4,006,867
orkut (OG) 2,783,196 8,730,857 327,037,487 1,980,077
Table 3 Characteristics of fair decompositions: number of blocks (k), edges used (e1), number
of matchings in the fair distribution (M).
dataset k e1 M
AM 194 143,425 13,762
Vui 72 84,003 1,068
Cti 151 157,744 2,726
B 179 212,667 4,119
WC 1468 1,883,431 350,518
M3 245 92,841 52,332
FG 924 435,612 109,242
Pa 2 1,425,813 2
Di 1117 1,784,259 305,104
de 163 432,472 5,596
LG 1480 3,314,628 302,410
WT 3612 27,842,321 16,548,387
OG 2266 3,041,112 224,738
a summary containing the fair decomposition, the satisfaction probabilities, and
the probability of each edge being used in the matching, which can be verified
independently. (Publishing an explicit list of M matchings of size ρ explicitly
would take much more space as many of these matchings share many edges.)
8.2 Running time
In Table 4 we present runtimes of all four methods for the datasets considered.
Dashes indicate times above one hour. We report user times; the real times are
within 2% of these in all cases except for OG, where the memory needs for graph
and data structures exceeded the RAM available (16Gb), causing excessive disk
swapping.
As MF has two clearly differentiated parts, we analyze two different runtimes:
– Time to compute the satisfaction probabilities of each user, and the probability
of using each edge in the maxmin-fair distribution (step 1, finding the fair
decomposition), reported in column MF1;
– Total time, including all of the above plus the time to find an edge coloring
for each block and the list of matchings for each block (step 2), reported in
column MF. (The time to draw a matching given this list, step 3, is negligible.)
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Table 4 Running time (in seconds) of UF, MF, PS and RP. The 1 subscript refers to the time
to compute assignment probabilities in the solution without converting them into a distribution
of matchings (only meaningful for MF and PS). Dashes indicate running times above one hour.
dataset UF MF1 MF PS1 RP
AM 0.34 1.812 9.309 832 11.27
Vui 0.38 1.206 1.251 717 0.39
Cti 0.42 1.731 1.820 1443 0.59
B 0.47 2.152 2.293 1764 0.74
WC 1.68 17.57 23.036 - 68.17
M3 1.08 11.12 319.13 485 72.18
FG 1.16 15.17 25.80 - 688.21
Pa 2.99 5.96 6.908 - 3.20
Di 3.10 23.37 24.714 - 67.83
de 6.99 21.67 22.007 - 52.84
LG 26.05 103.59 108.311 - -
WT 51.92 444.71 2270.81 - -
OG 98.20 370.76 381.524 - -
No clear pattern emerges as to which of these two phases is faster in practice.
As can be observed, in some instances (Vui, Cti, B, Di, de, LG, OG) the time
is dominated by the first phase, wheres in others (AM, M3 and WT) the total
time is much larger than the time for phase 1 only; in the latter cases the exact
requirement of maxmin-fairness forces the algorithm to need a large number of
matchings for some blocks, increasing the time for step 2. It seems likely that a
more relaxed requirement of approximate fairness could lead to vast improvements
in the runtime of step 2.
Similarly, for PS we differentiate between the time to compute the probability
of each edge being used (column PS1), and the total time including the former plus
the time to find a distribution of matchings which agrees with those probabilities.
However, this last step is much slower in the case of PS because in this case we
need to use the full Birkhoff-von Neumann decomposition, instead of exploiting the
degree regularity conditions of the blocks to find edge colorings as we do for MF.
Because existing implementations of the Birkhoff-von Neumann decomposition do
not scale even for the smaller graphs tested, we decided to omit the second phase
of PS (which is not required to analyze its fairness properties).
As is to be expected, the unfair algorithm UF is the fastest. As for the others,
the only one which can be run to completion within one hour in all datasets is
ours (MF). Its runtime is usually a handful of seconds except for the very large
graphs, where it is in the order of minutes (37 minutes at most, attained for the
graph WT). We can see that PS is the most computationally expensive, as many
iterations of its main loop are required to reach convergence, and each iteration
takes linear time. Finally, the runtime of RP is generally comparable to that of
MF on small and medium-size graphs, outperforming it on many of the smaller
graphs, but RP becomes slower for larger graphs; despite the additional complexity
of MF, the prioritymechanism of RP precludes the use of the push-relabel max-flow
algorithms, and also limits the number of simultaneous augmenting paths which
can be found during a single graph search in augmenting-path algorithms. Notice
that these are runtimes for a single run; if the satisfaction probabilities need to be
computed then it becomes necessary to run RP a large number of times, slowing
it down considerably. (This is not the case for MF or PS.)
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Table 5 Distribution of maxmin-fair satisfaction probabilities.
dataset λmin λ25% λ50% λ75% per1 N0
AM 0.156 1 1 1 76.18 0.860
Vui 0.0208 0.5 1 1 69.16 0.743
Cti 0.01 0.5 1 1 65.42 0.670
B 0.0128 0.5 1 1 58.63 0.630
WC 5.52e-4 0.0149 0.0417 0.1 2.17 0.0366
M3 0.0298 0.0833 0.137 0.1798 0.49 0.121
FG 0.001012 0.116 0.2 0.254 6.04 0.161
Pa 0.5 1 1 1 99.9999 0.99999
Di 0.000025 0.0135 0.0588 0.167 4.28 0.0377
de 0.00334 0.667 1 1 74 0.718
LG 1.83e-4 0.2 1 1 59.43 0.326
WT 4.38e-7 4e-6 1.26e-4 0.0294 10.89 0.000366
OG 0.00453 0.333 1 1 56.2 0.583
8.3 Satisfaction probability comparison
Next we analyze the satisfaction probabilities produced by maxmin-fair matchings
(MF) and compare with the probabilistic serial and random-priority mechanisms.
Note that the exact determination of the satisfaction probabilities of RP is compu-
tationally infeasible. To approximate them, we run RP a total of T = 1000 times
with independent uniformly random permutations. (Note, however, that this does
not give a good estimate of probabilities below 1/T .)
For this comparison we focus on the smaller graphs, due to the limited scalability
of PS (which needs a large number of iterations in its main loop, each taking linear
time) and RP (which needs to be run T times to approximate the satisfaction
probabilities).
Finally, table 5 reports the distribution of satisfaction probabilities: minimum
value (λmin), quantiles, percentage of users with satisfaction 1 (per1), and Nash
welfare (N0), the geometric mean of utilities (satisfaction probabilities in our set-
ting). Nash welfare is a standard measure of fairness when allocating divisible
resources [13]. As in [11], we also study the generalization of Nash welfare using
power means (for a parameter p ∈ R):
N0(D) =
(∏
u∈U
D[u]
)1/|U|
, (4)
Np(D) =
(∑
u∈U D[u]
p
|U|
)1/p
. (5)
When p = 1, Np(D) is the mean satisfaction probability, which equals ρ/|L|
for any Pareto-efficient mechanism. Taking the limit in (5) as p → 0 one ob-
tains (4) [35], justifying the notation N0 for (standard) Nash welfare. Taking the
limit as p→ −∞ yields minu∈U D[u], which by definition is maximized by MF.
Table 6 shows these metrics for the three mechanisms tested, on those graphs
where PS terminated in 8 hours. Notice that N1(MF) = N1(RP) > N1(PS), con-
firming thatMF and RP are Pareto-efficient but PS is not. The generalized welfares
for p < 1 are computed exactly for MF and PS, but estimated from the empirical
probabilities after T samples for RP. (For p = 0 we replace each empirical proba-
bility q by max(q, 1/T ) so that the estimate is non-zero.) MF comes out on top for
all (generalized) Nash welfares in all instances, in accordance with a result of [9].
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Table 6 Generalized Nash welfare of MF, PS and RP. Larger is better.
dataset AM Vui Cti B M3
N1(MF ) 0.898 0.824 0.784 0.746 0.151
N1(PS) 0.796 0.775 0.739 0.702 0.147
N1(RP ) 0.898 0.824 0.784 0.746 0.151
N0(MF ) 0.860 0.743 0.670 0.630 0.121
N0(PS) 0.695 0.684 0.618 0.580 0.0824
N0(RP ) 0.855 0.739 0.667 0.622 0.117
N−1(MF ) 0.797 0.585 0.470 0.445 0.0927
N−1(PS) 0.524 0.522 0.419 0.395 0.0452
N−1(RP ) 0.780 0.579 0.460 0.430 0.0868
N−2(MF ) 0.699 0.339 0.232 0.244 0.0720
N−2(PS) 0.335 0.300 0.210 0.214 0.0285
N−2(RP ) 0.659 0.332 0.228 0.230 0.0650
N−5(MF ) 0.409 0.0822 0.0431 0.0573 0.0486
N−5(PS) 0.100 0.0767 0.0429 0.025 0.0165
N−5(RP ) 0.333 0.0793 0.0429 0.0553 0.0397
Table 7 Fraction of satisfied users among the bottom t%.
dataset AM Vui Cti B M3
MF, t = 1 0.189 0.0610 0.0481 0.0459 0.0298
PS, t = 1 0.0640 0.0528 0.0417 0.039 0.00430
RP, t = 1 0.147 0.0518 0.0456 0.0439 0.0198
MF, t = 5 0.282 0.158 0.100 0.0970 0.0298
PS, t = 5 0.118 0.130 0.0870 0.0825 0.00605
RP, t = 5 0.256 0.144 0.0045 0.0914 0.0252
MF, t = 10 0.389 0.231 0.151 0.143 0.0338
PS, t = 10 0.167 0.192 0.128 0.123 0.00883
RP, t = 10 0.363 0.216 0.139 0.133 0.0290
MF, t = 20 0.513 0.344 0.238 0.221 0.0381
PS, t = 20 0.259 0.287 0.204 0.193 0.0157
RP, t = 20 0.506 0.326 0.229 0.212 0.0353
Interestingly, N0(RP) is typically within 1% of N0(MF) (as both solutions result
in a large proportion of users with high satisfaction), but for smaller p the gap can
widen to as much as 22% for p = −5, in accordance with the fact that MF was
designed to provide better guarantees to low-satisfaction users.
Table 7 shows the expected fraction of satisfied users among the bottom t%
using each method, for t = 1, 5, 10, and 20. Again, our method always gives the
highest values, the gap with the second best being as high as 50% in some instances
where t = 1.
Table 8 reports the variance of the logarithms of satisfaction probabilities over
uniformly random users, as a measure of inequality. (Taking logs penalizes wildly
varying ratios of satisfaction probabilities.)We see thatMF, which minimizes social
inequality in the sense of Def. 5, also tends to minimize this quantity in all datasets
tested.
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Table 8 Inequality measure: variance of log-satisfaction probabilities. Smaller is better.
dataset AM Vui Cti B M3
Var[log(MF)] 0.112 0.296 0.454 0.475 0.491
Var[log(PS)] 0.385 0.349 0.518 0.534 1.391
Var[log(RP)] 0.133 0.304 0.475 0.496 0.556
9 Related work
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study computationally efficient
randomized maxmin-fair matching algorithms, and to offer a general definition of
fairness for general search problems.
The work of Bogomolnaia and Mouline [9] on random matching under dichoto-
mous preferences is closely related to ours: they define an egalitarian solution and
show that it is envy-free, strategy-proof and group-strategy-proof with respect the
set of right or left vertices. As the authors note, they do not provide an axiomatic
characterization of their solution; rather, their definition of egalitarian is expressed
in terms of a specific algorithm and is thus not easily generalizable to other search
problems. By contrast, our definition of distributional maxmin-fairness applies to
any search problem with non-unique solutions and, in the special case of bipartite
matchings, is equivalent to the egalitarian solution. In [9] two simple algorithms are
proposed to find egalitarian matchings, both of them running in exponential time;
our work yields a practical polynomial-time algorithm for the problem. We found
no efficient algorithms or practical implementations of the egalitarian mechanism
prior to our work.
Building on [9], Roth et al [52] propose an egalitarian mechanism for the ex-
change of donor kidneys for transplant. McElfresh and Dickerson [47] propose a
tradeoff between fairness and a utilitarian objective function in kidney exchange
programs. Kamada and Kojima [40] study randomized matching mechanisms for
the design of matching markets under distributional constraints; their setup con-
tains full bipartite graphs equipped with complete and strict preference relation-
ships. Teo and Sethuraman [53] prove the existence of a “median” deterministic
solution to the stable matching problem which is fair to everyone, but finding a
polynomial-time algorithm remains an open problem. Cheng [15] presents a tech-
nique to approximate the median stable matching.
In the area of resource allocation problems, several works investigate the eq-
uitable distribution of divisible resources in networks. The work of Ichimori et
al [38] considers a minmax-style optimization function, whereas Katoh et al [42]
considers allocation problems so that the maximum of profit differences is min-
imized; none of these consider distributions of several solutions. Bansal et al [3]
give approximation algorithms for the Santa Claus problem, where a number of
indivisible presents are to be distributed among kids who have different values for
different presents, and the goal is to maximize the minimum happiness of a kid.
Bertsimas et al [6] introduce the price of fairness in resource allocation problems. A
substantial amount of work has also been devoted to cake-cutting algorithms and
their strategic and incentive properties: see [44,10,27] and the references therein.
Several authors have studied lexicographically optimal flows in networks (which
could be used in place of Step 1 of our algorithms): Meggido [48] designed an algo-
rithm with running time O(n5), whereas Brown [12] proposed a polynomial-time
algorithm requiring n max flow computations. On the other hand, the parametric
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flow algorithm of Gallo et al [30] can be used to find fair decompositions with a sin-
gle max flow, but is not compatible with the max flow algorithm of Goldberg [32].
None of these methods can be used to match the runtime of our algorithm to find
fair decompositions.
The bulk of the research in the area of algorithmic bias and fairness has mainly
focused on avoiding discrimination against a sensitive attribute (i.e., a protected
social group) in supervised machine learning [23,28,20]. Most of this literature
focuses on statistical parity, or group-level fairness, i.e., the difference in having
a positive outcome for a random individual drawn from two different subpopula-
tions (e.g., men and women). Feldman et al. [28] propose to repair attributes so as
to maintain per-attribute within-group ordering while enforcing statistical parity,
so that a single decision threshold applied to the transformed attributes would
result in equal success rate among the two different groups. Corbett-Davies et
al. [20] reformulate algorithmic fairness as constrained optimization in the context
of criminal justice: the objective is to maximize public safety while satisfying for-
mal fairness constraints designed to reduce disparities. Dwork et al. [23] provide
examples showing that statistical parity alone is not sufficient for fairness, and
study a randomized solution for classifiers to guarantee that “similar individuals
are treated similarly” in an expected sense. The idea that more qualified individ-
uals should be chosen preferentially is present in the work of Joseph et al. [39],
who study fairness in multi-armed bandit problems. Pedreschi et al. [49] intro-
duced the related data mining problem of discovering discrimination practices in
a given dataset containing past decisions; if such a dataset is used as training set
for a machine learning model, the bias detected can be fixed before the learning
phase [41,55]. Heidari et al [37] show that many existing definitions of algorith-
mic fairness, such as predictive value parity and equality of odds can be viewed
as instantiations of economic models of equality of opportunity. Heidari et al [36]
study a welfare-based measure of fairness for risk-averse individuals, and derive
an efficient mechanism for bounding individual-level inequality.
Finally, maxmin-fairness (in a non-distributional sense) as an objective is used
for flow control in networks [19,5]. In the context of non-discrimination, the con-
cept dates back at least to Rawls’s theory of justice [51], where a “difference
principle” is advocated whereby social and financial inequalities are required to be
to the advantage of the worst-off. In Rawls’s distributive justice, social measures
should be designed so as to bring the greatest benefit to the least-advantaged
members of society, in order to maximize their prospects.
10 Conclusions
In this paper we study the problem of algorithmic fairness towards the elements
that may or not be included in a solution of a matching problem. This is partic-
ularly (but not exclusively) important when these elements are humans. Towards
this goal, we propose the distributional maxmin fairness for randomized algo-
rithms. A series of theoretical results characterize maxmin-fair distributions and
pave the road to our practical contribution: an exact polynomial-time algorithm
for maxmin-fair bipartite matching, which scales to graphs with millions of vertices
and hundreds of millions of edges. We also discussed methods for the transparent
and accountable real-world deployment of our framework.
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Regarding future work, it would be interesting to consider notions of approx-
imate fairness intended to deal with optimization problems, where solutions may
have different business value, possibly unrelated to satisfaction probabilities. The
goal could be to reach a compromise between fairness and expected business value.
It would be desirable to be able to find approximately maxmin-fair distributions
more quickly than exact maxmin-fair distributions; we leave this as an open prob-
lem. Another interesting question is whether our methods can be extended to han-
dle online matching/streaming settings and/or graphs which do not fit into main
memory. Finally, future work may consider other notions of fairness for randomized
algorithms for people search, people ranking and other learning problems.
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A Proofs for Section 3: fairness and social inequality
Preliminaries. In order to prove Theorem 2, we need to recall some additonal facts about
matroids (refer to [45] for details). The rank function ρ : 2L → N of a matroid is monotone
submodular, meaning that for all S, T ⊆ L, it holds that 0 ≤ ρ(S∪T )−ρ(S) ≤ ρ(T )−ρ(S∩T ).
The dual matroid ofM is the matroid with ground set L given byM∗ = {L\S | S ∈M}; clearly
the dual ofM∗ isM itself. The rank function ofM∗ is given by ρ∗(S) = |S|−(ρ(L)−ρ(L\S)).
The contraction of M to the set L \ S is the matroid M/S with ground set L \ S and rank
function ρM/S(X) = ρ(S ∪X) − ρ(S). The restriction of M to the set S is the matroid M |S
with ground set S and independent sets M |
S
= {I ∈M | I ⊆ S}.
Proof of Lemma 1. Assume that the set
A = {u ∈ U | F [u] 6= D[u]}
is non-empty. Let
u = argmin{min(F [u],D[u]) | u ∈ A },
where ties are broken arbitrarily. Then D[u] 6= F [u]; suppose that D[u] > F [u]. Then for any
v ∈ A, our choice of u implies that D[v] ≥ min(D[v], F [v]) ≥ min(D[u], F [u]) = F [u]; and for
any v /∈ A, we have D[v] = F [v] by definition. In either case one of the inequalities required
by condition (1) fails, so F is not maxmin-fair. Put differently, we have shown the following
implication:
F is maxmin-fair =⇒ D[u] < F [u].
Similarly,
D is maxmin-fair =⇒ F [u] < D[u].
But then F and D cannot both be maxmin-fair. The only way out of this contradiction is to
conclude that A is empty.
Proof of Theorem 1. =⇒ Let F be maxmin-fair and consider any other distribution D. We
need to show that F ↑  D ↑ (that is, F ↑ is lexicographically largest). Define
A = {u ∈ U | F [u] 6= D[u]}.
If A is empty, the claim is trivial; otherwise let
u = argmin{F [u] | u ∈ A} and B = {v ∈ U | F [v] < F [u]}.
Note that u ∈ A ⊆ B by our choice of u. If D[u] > F [u], from the maxmin-fairness of F
we infer the existence of v ∈ A ⊆ B such that D[v] < F [u]. This also holds if D[u] < F [u]
(then we can take v = u). In any case we have
min{D[v] | v /∈ B} < F [u] = min{F [v] | v /∈ B}
and D[v] = F [v] < F [u] ∀v ∈ B.
It is readily verified that this implies F ↑ ≻ D ↑ .
⇐= Let F be a distribution which is not maxmin-fair. We show that F is not lexico-
graphically largest either. Since (1) does not hold for F , there exists another distribution D
and a user u ∈ U such that
D[u] > F [u] and (D[v] < F [v] =⇒ F [v] > F [u]) ∀v. (6)
For any ε ∈ (0, 1), let Xε denote the distribution picking F with probability 1− ε and D with
probability ε, so that
Xε[v] = F [v] + ε(D[v]− F [v]) ∀v.
Choose ε > 0 small enough so as to guarantee that
(F [v] < F [u] =⇒ Xε[v] < Xε[u]) ∀v (7)
and
(F [v] > F [u] =⇒ Xε[v] > Xε[u]) ∀v. (8)
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For instance, any
ε < min
{
|F [u]− F [v]|
|D[v]− F [v]|+ |D[u]− F [u]|
∣∣∣F [v] 6= F [u]
}
will do. We have, by (6),
(F [v] ≤ F [u] =⇒ D[v] ≥ F [v] =⇒ Xε[v] ≥ F [v]) ∀v (9)
and D[u] > F [u]. (10)
But (7), (8), (9) and (10) say that Xε ↑ is strictly larger than F ↑ in lexicographical order, as
we wished to show.
The following two analogues of Lemma 1 and Theorem 1 are also needed for the proof of
Theorem 2:
Lemma 7 If F and D are both minmax-Pareto, then F [u] = D[u] for all u ∈ U .
Proof. Assume that the set
A = {u ∈ U | F [u] 6= D[u]}
is non-empty. Let
u = argmax{max(F [u],D[u]) | u ∈ A },
where ties are broken arbitrarily. Then D[u] 6= F [u]; suppose that D[u] < F [u]. Then for any
v ∈ A, our choice of u implies that D[v] ≤ max(D[v], F [v]) ≤ max(D[u], F [u]) = F [u]; and for
any v /∈ A, we have D[v] = F [v] by definition. In either case one of the inequalities required by
the definition of minmax-Pareto efficiency fails. Put differently, we have shown the following
implication:
F is minmax-Pareto =⇒ D[u] > F [u].
Similarly,
D is minmax-Pareto =⇒ F [u] > D[u].
But then F and D cannot both be minmax-Pareto. The only way out of this contradiction is
to conclude that A is empty.
Theorem 14 For matroid problems, a distribution F is minmax-Pareto if and only if F is
Pareto-efficient and F ↓  D ↓ for all Pareto-efficient distributions D.
Proof. First observe that, for matroids, a distribution is Pareto-efficient if and only if it is
supported over bases. For any distribution D of bases over a matroid M with ground set L,
consider the distribution D∗ of (L \ X | X ∼ D) of bases over the dual matroid M∗. Then
we have D[u] + D∗[u] = 1 for all u ∈ L, so clearly F is minmax-Pareto if and only if F ∗ is
maxmin-fair, which (by Theorem 1) occurs if and only if F ∗ is lexicographically largest for
M∗, which in turn is equivalent to F being lexicographically smallest among distributions of
bases of M , as we wished to show.
Our next result asserts that the only obstruction to achieving high satisfaction probability
for every user is the existence of a set of users with small rank-to-size ratio. Finding these
obstruction sets will enable us to devise a divide and conquer strategy to obtain fair distribu-
tions. For instance, in Example 1 the obstruction set is given by the set of users {a0, a2, a3},
which force the maximum satisfaction probability to be no larger than 2
3
.
Theorem 15 Let M be a matroid with ground set L and rank function ρ : 2L → N. The
minimum satisfaction probability in a minmax-fair distribution over M is
pi(M) = min
{
ρ(X)
|X|
| 0 6= X ⊆ L
}
.
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Proof. Any maxmin-fair distribution is supported on the collection B of bases of M , since ex-
tending an independent set to a base containing it never decreases any satisfaction probability.
Optimizing the smallest satisfaction probability λ1 amounts to finding a suitable distribution
over B; let us denote the corresponding probabilities by {pB}B∈B . Since the probability of
v ∈ U being included is
∑
v∈B pB , maximizing the minimum such probability is modeled by
Program (11) below. It may be written as a linear program by introducing an additional vari-
able λ to be maximized, and introducing the constraints
∑
B∋v pB ≥ λ. Its dual is equivalent
to (12).
max min
v∈U
∑
B∋v
pB
s.t.
∑
B∈B
pB = 1
pB ≥ 0
(11)
min max
B∈B
∑
v∈B
zv
s.t.
∑
v∈U
zv = 1
zv ≥ 0.
(12)
Observe that maxB∈B
∑
v∈B zv is the value of a maximum-weight base of M , with weights
given by {zv}v∈U . Thus LP (12) encodes the task of finding an assignment of weights to
elements of U minimizing the maximum weight of a base. We will turn this min-max problem
into a pure minimization problem.
Edmonds [25] showed that for any fixed assignment of non-negative weights to the elements
of M , a maximum-weight base may be found via the greedy algorithm that examines each
element in order of decreasing weight and adds it to the current set if its addition does not
violate independence. Let Π denote the set of permutations of U = {1, 2, . . . , n}. Write
∆ =

z ∈ RU
∣∣ ∑
v∈U
zv = 1, zv ≥ 0 ∀v ∈ U


for the probability simplex on U and let G(pi) = {z ∈ ∆ | zpi(1) ≥ zpi(2) ≥ . . . ≥ zpi(n)} denote
the elements of ∆ which become sorted after applying permutation pi ∈ Π.
Note that if z, z′ ∈ G(pi), then the two bases obtained via the greedy algorithm with vertex
weights {zv} and {z′v} are the same. For each pi ∈ Π, let B(pi) denote the base obtained via
the greedy algorithm; Edmond’s result may then be written as
max
B∈B
∑
v∈B
zv =
∑
v∈B(pi)
zv if z ∈ G(pi).
By LP (12), the fairness parameter λ1 is
min
z∈∆
max
B∈B
∑
v∈B
zv = min
pi∈Π
min
z∈G(pi)
max
B∈B
∑
v∈B
zv = min
pi∈Π
min
z∈G(pi)
∑
v∈B(pi)
zv. (13)
We claim that, for each pi ∈ Π and each non-empty X ⊆ U ,
min
z∈G(pi)
∑
v∈X
zv = min
i∈[n]
|X ∩ pi([i])|
i
, (14)
where pi([i]) = {pi(1), . . . , pi(i)}.
This means that, if we are given advice on the permutation pi which sorts an optimal
solution z to LP (12), then we can find another solution zˆ with the same value and whose
non-zero weights are evenly distributed among the top t elements of z in sorted order, for
some t ∈ [n]. For some optimal t, each of the t non-zero values of zˆi is either 0 or 1/t. To see
this assuming 14, notice that we can construct such zˆ by setting zˆpi(i) =
1
t
for 1 ≤ i ≤ t and
zˆj = 0 for j /∈ pi([t]).
To see why (14) holds, define dn = zpi(n) and di = zpi(i)− zpi(i+1) ≥ 0 for 0 < i < n. Then
zpi(i) =
∑
j≥i di, hence
∑
v∈X
zv =
∑
i∈[n]


1[pi(i) ∈ X] ·
∑
j≥i
di

 = ∑
j∈[n]
dj · |X ∩ pi([j])|.
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The conditions
∑
v∈U zv = 1 and z ∈ G(pi) then become
∑
i i · di = 1 and di ≥ 0. Therefore
min
z∈G(pi)
∑
v∈X
zv = min


∑
i∈[n]
di · |X ∩ pi([i])|
∣∣∣ ∑
i∈[n]
i · di = 1, di ≥ 0

 .
The quantity in the right-hand side equals the smallest ratio (among all i) between the co-
efficient of di in the objective function (|X ∩ pi([i])|) and in the only equality constraint (i),
proving (14). From (13) and (14) the theorem follows, because the greedy algorithm satisfies
|B(pi) ∩ pi([i])| = ρ(pi[i]) for all i, so if S∗ = argmin
S⊆U
ρ(S)
|S|
, then for any pi ∈ Π we have
min
z∈G(pi)
∑
v∈B(pi)
zv = min
i∈[n]
|B(pi) ∩ pi([i])|
i
= min
i∈[n]
ρ(pi([i]))
|pi([i])|
≥
ρ(S∗)
|S∗|
,
and equality holds for any permutation where the elements of S∗ precede those of U \S∗.
Theorem 16 Let M be a matroid with ground set L and rank function ρ : 2L → N. The
maximum satisfaction probability in a minmax-Pareto distribution over M is
Π(M) = max
{
ρ(L) − ρ(X)
|L \X|
| 0 ⊆ X ( L
}
.
Proof. Apply Theorem 15 to the dual matroid of M .
An extension of Theorem 15 allows us to compute the satisfaction probability of every
element of L.
Lemma 8 Define a sequence of sets B1, B2, . . . , Bk iteratively by:
Bi is a maximal set X ⊆ L \ Si−1 minimizing
ρ(X ∪ Si−1) − ρ(Si−1)
|X|
, where Si =
⋃
j≤i
Bi.
(15)
We stop when Si = L (which will eventually occur as the sequence {Si} is strictly increasing).
Then for every i, u ∈ Bi, the satisfaction probability of u in a maxmin-fair distribution F is
λi =
ρ(Bi)
|Bi|
.
(Maximality of each Bi is not required for the conclusion to hold, but its inclusion guar-
antees uniqueness of the sets thus defined, owing to the submodularity of ρ.)
Proof. We reason by induction on the number k of sets. First, observe that Theorem 15
implies F [u] ≥ λ1 for all u ∈ L. As the expected number of satisfied elements within B1,
which obviously cannot exceed ρ(B1) = λ1|B1|, is equal to
E
A∼F
[|A ∩B1|] =
∑
u∈B1
F [u] ≥ λ1|B1| (16)
by linearity of expectation, the equality F [u] = λ1 must hold for all u ∈ B1. If k = 1, this
shows the result.
If k > 1, let D1 be a maxmin-fair distribution for the restriction M |B1
of M to B1 and
let D2 be a maxmin-fair distribution for the contraction M/(L \ B1) of M to the remaining
elements L \ B1. Since restriction does not change the rank function within B1, D1 satisfies
D1[u] = F [u] = λ1 for all u ∈ B1. The rank function of the contraction M/(L \ B1) is
ρM/B1 (X) = ρ(X ∪ B1) − ρ(B1), so by applying rule (21) iteratively we obtain the same
sequence of sets B2, . . . , Bk (excluding B1), and by the induction hypothesis D2 satisfies
D2[u] = λi for all i ≥ 2, u ∈ Bi. It remains to be shown that D2[u] = F [u] for all u /∈ B1.
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Denote by [D1 ∪ D2] denote the distribution of (A ∪ B | A ∼ D1, B ∼ D2). This is a
distribution over independent sets of M by the following property of matroid contractions
(see [45]):
for any base B of M |
B1
, a subset I ⊆ L \B1 is independent in M/B1
if and only if I ∪B1 is independent in M . (17)
On the other hand, for any set A in the support of a maxmin-fair distribution F , the set A∩B1
must be a base of M |
B1
(or else Equation (16) would fail). Let F2 denote the distribution
(A \B1 | A ∼ F ); by (17), F2 is a distribution over elements of the contraction M/B1.
To complete the proof, observe that F ↑ [D1∪D2] ↑ by Theorem 1 because F is maxmin-
fair. As F [u] = D1[u] < F [v],D[v] for u ∈ B1, v ∈ L \ B1, the fact that F ↑ [D1 ∪ D2] ↑
implies F2 ↑ D2 ↑, and the maxmin-fairness of D2 allows us to deduce that F2 ↑= D2 ↑.
Hence, by Lemma 1, for all v /∈ B1 we have F [v] = F2[v] = D2[v].
Similarly, we have the following for minmax-fairness.
Lemma 9 Define a sequence of sets B′1, . . . , B
′
k′
iteratively by:
B′i is a maximal set X ⊆ L \ Si maximizing
ρ(S′i)− ρ(S
′
i \X)
|X|
, where S′i = L \
⋃
j<i
B′i. (18)
We stop when S′k = ∅.Then for every i, u ∈ B
′
i, the satisfaction probability of u in a minmax-
Pareto distribution F is λ′i =
ρ(B′
i
)
|B′
i
|
.
Proof. We argue by induction on k. First, observe that Theorem 16 implies F [u] ≤ λ1 for all
u ∈ L. The expected number of satisfied elements within B1 cannot be below λ1|B1| for any
Pareto-efficient distribution F , otherwise we would have the contradiction
ρ(L) = E
A∼F
|A| = E
A∼F
[|A ∩B1|] + E
A∼F
[|A \B1|] < λ1|B1|+ ρ(L \B1) = ρ(L).
On the other hand,
E
A∼F
[|A ∩ B1|] =
∑
u∈B1
F [u] ≤ λ1|B1| = ρ(B1) (19)
by linearity of expectation, so the equality F [u] = λ1 must hold for all u ∈ B1. If k = 1, this
shows the result. The rest of the proof is completely analogous to that of Lemma 8, except
that we use Theorem 14 and Lemma 7 in place of Theorem 1 and Lemma 1.
Proof of Theorem 2. It suffices to prove the equivalence (1) ⇔ (2). Inded, if it holds, then
a maxmin-fair distribution simultaneously maximizes the minimum satisfaction probability
and minimizes the maximum satisfaction probability (among Pareto-efficient distributions),
hence it also minimizes the largest difference between two satisfaction probabilities. An easy
inductive argument (omitted) shows that the equivalence (1) ⇔ (3) then follows.
To show that (1)⇔ (2), consider the sequence B1, . . . , Bk from Lemma 8 and the sequence
B′1, . . . , B
′
k′
from Lemma 9. It suffices to show that they are the same sequence in reverse:
k = k′ and Bi = B′k+1−i for all i. We proceed from top to bottom, showing by induction that
for each value of i from 1 to k, B′i = Bk+1−i. Consider any Z ∈ Si+1 = Si ∪ Bi, which may
be split into Z = X ∪ Y where X ⊆ Si =
⋃
j<i Bi and Y ∈ Bi. Then we have
ρ(Z)− ρ(Si) ≥ ρ(Si ∪ Y )− ρ(Si) ≥ λi|Y |,
where the first inequality is by submodularity of ρ, and the second by construction of Bi. On
the other hand,
ρ(Si+1) − ρ(Si) = λi|Bi|,
hence
ρ(Si+1)− ρ(Z)
|Si+1 \ Z|
≥
λi|Bi|+ ρ(Si)− (λi|Y |+ ρ(Si))
|Bi \ Y |
= λi.
Notice that equality holds when Z = Bi, so Bi maximizes
ρ(Si+1)−ρ(Z)
|Si+1\Z|
over all Z ⊆ Si+1.
Using the definition of B′
i′
, this means that B′
i′
= B′i, as we wished to show.
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B Proofs for Section 4: a polynomial-time algorithm for maxmin-fair
matching
Proof of Corollary 3. From Theorem 3 it follows that, when ρ(L) = |R|, the rank function
of a bipartite matching problem is given by
ρ(S) = min
T⊆S
|Γ (T )|+ |S| − |T |. (20)
Define
α = max
S(L
|Γ (L)| − |Γ (S)|
|L \ S|
; β = max
S(L
ρ(L)− ρ(S)
|L \ S|
.
In view of Corollary 16 and the equivalence between maxmin and minmax fairness for matroid
problems (Theorem 2), it suffices to show that α = β. Since ρ(L) = |Γ (L)| and ρ(S) ≤ |Γ (S)|
for all S, inequality α ≤ β is immediate. To show that β ≤ α, it suffices to prove that
ρ(L) − ρ(S) − α|L \ S| ≤ 0 for all S ⊆ L. This follows from (20) and the fact that α ≤ β ≤ 1:
ρ(L)− ρ(S)− α|L \ S| = max
T⊆S
Γ (L)− Γ (T )− |S|+ |T | − α|L \ S|
≤ max
T⊆S
α|L \ T | − |S \ T | − α|L \ S|
≤ 0.
Lemma 10 Define a sequence of sets B1, B2, . . . , Bk iteratively by:
Bi is a maximal set X ⊆ L \ Si−1 minimizing
|Γ (X ∪ Si−1)| − |Γ (Si)|
|X|
, where Si =
⋃
j<i
Bi.
(21)
Stop when Sk = L.Then for every i, u ∈ Bi, the satisfaction probability of u in a maxmin-fair
distribution F is λi =
ρ(Bi)
|Bi|
, and any w ∈ Γ (Bi) \ Γ (Si−1) is matched to some u ∈ Bi with
probability 1.
Proof. Since the sequence S0, S1, . . . is strictly increasing (with respect to inclusion) and L is
finite, there exists some k such that Sk = L.
For each i = 0, . . . , k, let Hi denote the graph (G/Si−1)|L\Si−1
, i.e., the result of removing
the vertices in Si−1 and all their incident edges. For i = 1, . . . , k, we argue by induction on
i that the coverage probabilities of F outside of Si−1 coincide with those of a maxmin-fair
distribution for Hi; and and moreover the probabilities are as prescribed by the statement of
the lemma.
The case i = 1 is trivial, so assume i > 1. By Corollary 2, there is a distribution of match-
ings in Hi with minimum satisfaction probability at least λi; the expected number of covered
elements from Bi is then at least λi|Bi| = |Γ (Bi)\Γ (Si−1)| = |ΓHi(Bi)|. Hence equality must
always hold, and the maxmin-fair distribution Fi for Hi has satisfaction probability precisely
λi for all u ∈ Bi. By the induction hypothesis, F [u] = Fi[u] = λi for all u ∈ Bi. Now observe
that the neighbors of Bi that belong to Si−1 are already matched with probability 1. There
are only |ΓHi(Bi)| other neighbors, and since the expected number of covered neighbours of
Bi in F is equal to |ΓHi(Bi)|, it follows that any w ∈ ΓHi(Bi) is matched to some v ∈ Bi
with probability 1 in F . In particular, in F no element of ΓHi(Bi) is matched to any vertex
outside Bi with non-zero probability, so the satisfaction probabilities of F outside of Si must
coincide with those of of a maxmin-fair distribution for Hi+1.
Lemma 11 For any two distinct fairly isolated sets X and Y , either X ⊆ Y or Y ⊆ X holds.
Proof. By Corollaries 2 and 3, X 6= ∅ is fairly isolated if and only if X = L or
Π(G|
S
) = max
S(X
|Γ (X)| − |Γ (S)|
|X \ S|
< pi(G/S) = min
T)X
|Γ (T )| − |Γ (X)|
|T \X|
.
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For any two sets A,B such that A ( B, define d(A | B) = |Γ (A∪B)|−|Γ (B)|
|A\B|
. Then we can
rewrite the definition of fair isolation (including the case X = L) as:
X is fairly isolated ⇔ d(X | S) < d(T | X) ∀ S ( X, T ) X.
Now assume for contradiction X and Y are fairly isolated but X \ Y and Y \X are both
non-empty. Then d(X | X ∩ Y ) and d(Y | X ∩ Y ) are well defined; assume without loss of
generality that d(X | X ∩ Y ) ≤ d(Y | X ∩ Y ). Then
d(X | X ∩ Y ) ≤ d(Y | X ∩ Y ) < d(X ∪ Y | Y ),
where we used the fair isolation of Y . But this contradicts the fair isolation of X.
Proof of Theorem 5. Let B′1, . . . , B
′
k be the sequence of sets given by Lemma 10 and define
S′i =
⋃
j≤i B
′
i, λ
′
i =
Γ (S′
i
∪B′
i
)−Γ (S′
i
)
|B′
i
|
and λ′0 = 0. We show that S
′
1, . . . , S
′
k comprise all fairly
isolated sets. Assuming this for the moment, notice that by definition these sets form a chain,
and the sets B′1, . . . , B
′
k satisfy property (a) by Lemma 10. Part (b) follows then by applying
the fair decomposition to the dual of the matching matroid, using Corollary 3, and recalling
that maxmin-fairness and minmax-Pareto efficiency are equivalent for matroids (Theorem 2).
To see that S′1, . . . , S
′
k−1 are fairly isolated, notice that S
′
k = L indeed is by definition,
whereas for i < k we have Π(G|
S′
i
) = maxu∈Si F [u] = λ
′
i < λ
′
i+1 = pi(G/S
′
i). This meets the
definition of fair separation from Section 4.4.
The fact that the fairly isolated sets form a chain is a direct consequence of Lemma 11.
Finally, assume for contradiction that some fairly isolated set X exists other than S′1, . . . , S
′
k.
Then S′i ( X ( S
′
i+1 for some i, 0 ≤ i < k. Then we have
λ′i+1 ≤
|Γ (X)| − |Γ (S′i)|
|X \ S′i|
<
|Γ (S′i+1)| − |Γ (X)|
|S′i+1 \X|
, (22)
where the first inequality is by construction of B′i+1 and S
′
i+1, and the second by the fair
isolation of X. But then
λ′i+1|S
′
i+1 \X|+ |Γ (X)| < |Γ (S
′
i+1)| = |Γ (S
′
i)|+ λ
′
i+1|B
′
i|,
i.e.,
|Γ (X)| − |Γ (S′i)| < λ
′
i+1|X \ S
′
i|,
contradicting (22).
